Geoforum 89 (2018) 124–136

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Geoforum

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-family rental housing: The case of Toronto

Martine August[a], Alan Walks[b,*]

[a] Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA
[b] Department of Geography, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S-3G3, Canada

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:
Financialization
Apartments
REITs
Inequality
Gentrification
Suburban decline

ABSTRACT

While traditional forms of gentrification involved the conversion of rental units to owner-occupation, a new rental-tenure form of gentrification has emerged across the globe. This is driven by financialization, reduced tenant protections, and declining social-housing production, and is characterized by the replacement of poorer renters with higher-income tenants. Many poorer renters are in turn being displaced out of the inner city and into older suburban neighbourhoods where aging apartment towers had provided a last bastion of affordable accommodation, but which are now also targeted by large rental housing corporations. These dynamics are increasingly dominated by what we call 'financialized landlords,' including those owned or run by private equity funds, financial asset management corporations, and real estate investment trusts (REITS). Such firms float securities on domestic and international markets and use the proceeds to purchase older rental buildings charging affordable rents, and then apply a range of business strategies to extract value from the buildings, existing tenants and local neighbourhoods, and flow them to investors. This paper documents this process in Toronto, Canada's largest city and a city experiencing both sustained gentrification and advanced suburban restructuring. The financialization of rental housing in Toronto was enabled by neoliberal state policies to withdraw from social housing, deregulate rental protections, and decontrol rents – creating an affordability crisis for tenants and an opportunity for investors to profit. The paper maps out the history and locations of buildings that have been purchased by various financial investment vehicles, and analyzes the various strategies that such firms have adopted. We document two key strategies for extracting value, which we call squeezing, and gentrification-by-upgrading and show how these two strategies are conceptually and spatially linked in speeding up the restructuring of the social geography of the city.

1. Introduction

Since the end of the global financial crisis (GFC), media reports have documented increasingly aggressive activities of a number of new landlords in Toronto. For example, in 2014, tenants across the city in buildings bought by Akelius Canada Limited, a Swedish-based, Bahamas-registered private real estate company, began to notice changes in the way their homes were being managed. Building-wide renovations were initiated, superintendents were fired, vacant units were remodelled, and rent increases pursued (Gallant, 2014a, 2014b; Spurr, 2014). This "repositioning" of apartment buildings has been adopted by other landlords as well, most of whom were new to Toronto's rental housing market, representing a shift from the practices of 'mom-and-pop' landlords who have traditionally dominated apartment ownership in the city.

Such trends are being driven by a new breed of what we call 'financialized landlords,' which include real estate investment trusts (REITs), private equity funds, financial asset management firms, and other investment vehicles. In this paper we explore the financialization of rental housing in Toronto, tracing the entry of these new players into the city's multi-family residential sector in the late 1990s, and the intensification of their activities post-GFC. In addition, we explore the impacts of this shift on tenants and on patterns of spatial inequality in the city. In Toronto, low-rent apartment buildings are a final frontier for gentrification, remaining as last bastions of affordability amidst landscapes of gentrified retail and low-rise housing (Walks and Maaranen, 2008a). The (re)discovery of apartment buildings as a basis for capital accumulation has changed this reality, as these actors apply resources and sophisticated asset management strategies to upgrade, flip, and gentrify entire buildings. In non-gentrifying areas, meanwhile, financialized landlords squeeze revenues from lower-income tenants in aging concrete tower blocks. State policy has enabled this trend through

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: martine.j.august@gmail.com (M. August), alan.walks@utoronto.ca (A. Walks).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.04.011
Received 5 December 2016; Received in revised form 11 April 2017; Accepted 16 April 2017
Available online 27 May 2017
0016-7185/

legislation to create new vehicles for financial investment in real estate, and through policies to decontrol rents, deregulate tenant protections, and withdraw from social housing provision. These policies have resulted in a landscape of crisis for tenants and of new opportunities for diverse investors.

This paper explores how the financialization of rental housing is re-shaping Toronto's urban rental housing market and in turn restructuring the social space of the city. We begin with a discussion of financialization, and the financialization of rental housing in particular. Next, we explore the context for this, tracing the history of rental housing in Toronto, and how state policy has remade multi-family apartments into a profitable target for financial investors. We then look at the actors re-shaping Toronto's rental housing market, focusing on their motivations, business models, and geographic investment strategies, both before and after the GFC. We shed light on how the differential strategies of financialized landlords facilitate displacement and gentrification in the inner city, while intensifying hardship for tenants as well as concentrating lower-income tenants in the post-war suburbs.

2. The financialization of multi-family rental housing

While much of the focus in the literature, particularly since the GFC, has been on the financialization of owner-occupied housing through mortgage securitization and the like (e.g. Aalbers, 2008, 2016), multi-family rental housing has also increasingly been treated as a financial asset (Fields, 2014; Fields and Uffer, 2016; Teresa, 2015). Financialization refers to structural changes in the operation of capitalism in which finance has come to play an increasingly dominant role in the economy and everyday life, with broad reaching and transformative impacts (Arrighi, 1994; Boyer, 2000; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Soederberg, 2014; for a critique, see Christophers, 2016). Financialization represents a shift in the source of profits, in which "profit-making occurs increasingly through financial channels rather than through trade or commodity production" (Krippner, 2005). It is marked by the increasing penetration of financial practices, logics, and strategies into non-financial sectors, including the housing sector. Speaking to its extensive scope, Aalbers (2016, 2) defines financialization as "the increasing dominance of financial actors, markets, practices, measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and households." In turn, financialization is transforming the way decisions are made in the business world, with the goal to maximize short-term "shareholder value" dominating corporate governance at the expense of competing priorities (Froud et al., 2000; Clarke, 2014).

Over the past few decades, housing markets have increasingly become entangled with finance, linking the fates of homeowners and renters to volatile financial markets (Aalbers, 2016; Rolnik, 2013). Housing has always been a unique commodity, in which the contradiction between its "use value" as a home, and its "exchange value" as a saleable commodity, can lead to tensions in housing markets, policies, and day-to-day experiences of homeowners, landlords, and tenants. With financialization, these tensions are intensified, with housing treated as a purely financial asset at the expense of the people who view it as shelter. Haila (2016) associates financialization with a new "land regime" in which all land is treated as an "asset and object of speculative investment," assessed exclusively in terms of its potential yield – making it more vulnerable to speculation and financial cycles (33). According to Rolnik (2013, 1059), housing has represented a new frontier for finance capital in recent decades, with its value turning on the "possibility of creating more value." This depends on ever-faster transaction velocity to generate value appreciation. To this end, securitization, which takes opaque, illiquid, and unique assets – like housing and real estate – and repackages them into "standardized, transparent, and interest-bearing securities for resale" listed on public exchanges or proffered in securities markets (Gotham, 2009, 357) – has become a key technology of financialization. This process enables the creation of "liquidity out of spatial fixity" (Gotham, 2009) providing new opportunities for global finance capital to penetrate formerly untapped sectors and communities, to integrate these with financial markets, and to extract vast profits. Notably, a number of scholars (Aalbers, 2016; Wyly et al., 2006, 2009; Wyly and Ponder, 2011) have found that financialization stimulated more predatory forms of lending and investment, and has disproportionately harmed vulnerable people, including women, the elderly, and members of racialized communities.

While literature on the financialization of housing has focused largely on homeownership, scholars point to the financialization of multi-family rental housing in places such as New York City (Fields, 2014; Teresa, 2015; Wyly et al., 2010), London (Beswick et al., 2016), and Berlin (Fields and Uffer, 2016). This involves the acquisition of multi-family properties by private equity funds, REITS, hedge funds, institutional investors (pension and sovereign wealth funds), and the like. In New York City, Fields (2014) found that private equity funds aggressively began to target rent stabilized multi-family housing in the mid-2000s, buying up 10% of the city's total supply (about 100,000 units) between 2005 and 2009. Sudden interest in this sector was driven by the availability of cheap financing, strong local demand for rental housing, and rent control deregulation in the 1990s enabling "vacancy decontrol", in which landlords can dramatically increase rents upon unit turnover. This shift transformed patterns of ownership of rental housing in New York, according to Teresa (2015, 2), "from a previous generation of local, independent landlords to short-term private equity owners". Rather than being owned by a landlord or housing company, ownership of apartments is increasingly spread among a diffuse array of investors (in relation to their share of securities), who share in the income stream generated by monthly rents. These types of landlords, according to Haila, are focused exclusively on investor yield, "accelerating land use changes and displacing those users who cannot afford to pay higher rents" (2016, 212). Among housing advocates, this style of investment has been termed "predatory equity" (Fields, 2014), since yield is often achieved via practices that harm residents, such as cutting costs or initiating displacement.

Financial players adopt a range of strategies to profit from multi-family housing, depending on geographies of market conditions. Fields and Uffer (2016) found that in strong markets facing gentrification pressures, private equity firms have opted to upgrade properties: renovating, raising rents, and often flipping buildings. In weaker markets, profits came from effectively leveraging credit to take advantage of low interest rates and to focus on lower-rent segments of the market (Fields and Uffer, 2016). Teresa (2015, 9) found that in non-gentrifying parts of New York's outlying boroughs, private equity firms opted to strategically under-maintain and raise rents in buildings occupied by low-income and immigrant populations, who – given their limited housing options – are often forced to absorb rent increases and accept reduced service. In all cases, there have been reports of negative impacts on tenants, who face an assortment of rental increases, reduced maintenance and accelerated neglect, disruptive renovations, harassment, eviction, and displacement (Teresa, 2015; Fields and Uffer, 2016).

This nascent literature implicates financialization in the restructuring of the social geography of the city. The process has been associated with heightened gentrification pressures, and the creation of exclusive enclaves for an emergent financial class, alongside increased displacement and housing insecurity for working and marginalized groups (Lees et al., 2008; Rolnik, 2013). In New York City, for instance, low-income renters displaced from gentrifying areas were found to be more likely to re-locate to poorer neighbourhoods and "the more distant zones of the outer boroughs" (Wyly et al., 2010, 2614) where rents remained more affordable. In understanding how financialization reshapes the social geography of the city, the roles of financialized landlords and their varied strategies have received little attention, and it is not yet clear how these strategies might influence suburban change and its relationship with gentrification. Furthermore, it remains unknown how the financialization of rental housing affects the social geography of the city beyond a small subset of large global cities (New York, London, and Berlin). This article seeks to shed light on these gaps.

3. Data and methods

The findings in this paper derive from two key sets of sources. First, we draw on a dataset constructed by one of the authors containing the location of buildings owned by financialized landlords in the City of Toronto, the year or decade in which it was built, and the year of acquisition. Given that there is no existing, publicly-available inventory of buildings and their owners, we compiled this from sources including public filings, firms' websites, and data from the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC, an arms-length agency set up by the Ontario provincial government to assess and collect information on property taxes in the province). Since not all financialized landlords publicize their holdings, the numbers of buildings and units we trace should be considered a conservative minimum, indicative of how the overall sector has been developing. We coded each building by census tract, and analyzed the relationship between these locations and the characteristics of the local area. Secondly, in order to understand the strategies of these landlords, we analyzed business prospectuses, annual reports, and other documents filed by REITs and other publicly traded companies, as well as websites, newspaper articles, and industry publications, to make sense of the trends emerging from this data.[1] To analyze spatio-temporal patterns in investment, we calculate proportional differences in the property holdings located in various categories of neighbourhoods, including those based on zone (city or suburb), income (rising or falling), gentrification status, and socio-demographic variables.

Toronto provides an excellent case study for this research. At the centre of the country's largest metropolitan region, the city has a huge rental sector, with 443,635 tenant households (46% of all households are renters). It is Canada's financial centre, with the largest concentration of financial firms and headquarters, many of which are in the downtown core. Partly due to this, Toronto has seen the most rapid gentrification among Canadian cities since the 1970s, with very few inner-city neighbourhoods left untouched by the 2000s (Walks and Maaranen, 2008a; Walks, 2014a). Furthermore, Toronto's rental sector has been subject to numerous policy shifts, often imposed by the Ontario provincial government, which have set the stage not only for gentrification (Slater, 2004), but also for the entry of REITs and other financialized landlords seeking to profit from such policy changes. Before we discuss our findings, it is important to understand this history.

4. From social housing to vacancy decontrol: Creating space for financialized landlords

The development of purpose-built multi-family rental housing had its heyday in Canada from the late-1950s through to the mid-1970s (see Suttor, 2016). At this time new high-rise construction technology, affordable financing, and low vacancy rates made the sector appealing to small- and medium-sized firms. In Toronto, a few larger firms (including Greenwin, the Meridian Group, and what would become Cadillac Fairview) built thousands of apartment units during this period. During the 1960s, builders of private rental buildings accessed federal financing and largely built slab-style towers with over 200 units, in the city's growing suburbs and on land assembled (sometimes through block-busting) in the inner city. Apartments were also favoured as tax shelters for construction companies (Clayton, 1990, 66–67). In the 1970s and 1980s, the economics supporting multi-family construction deteriorated, due to increased financing and construction costs, although both public and private construction (at reduced levels) was sustained with new federal subsidy programs.

Rental housing construction declined through the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the private sector, as developers of multi-family buildings turned their attention to the higher profits attainable from condominium development (see Rosen and Walks, 2015; Walks and Clifford, 2015). Toronto experienced a deep recession in the early 1990s, and by the end of the decade rental construction was not enough to keep pace with the loss of units from demolition, and condominium conversion (Shapcott, 2002). By the time Toronto's multi-family sector caught the interest of investors in the late 1990s, it was characterized by decades of low construction and under-maintenance, particularly for the aging towers built in the early postwar period. Ownership was also fragmented, dispersed widely among many small-scale companies and mom-and-pop landlords, and a few large landlords (such as those named above).

Although the private sector effectively abandoned rental housing construction in the 1980s, multi-family housing continued to be built, largely in the form of co-operative and non-profit housing supported by federal housing policy (see Walks, 2006). This changed abruptly in 1993, when the federal government eliminated funding for new social housing and initiated downloading the responsibility for social housing administration and funding onto provincial governments. In Ontario, a socially democratic administration temporarily picked up the slack (with funding for 10,000 new social housing units), but in 1995 a newly-elected Conservative government cancelled these commitments and in 1998 downloaded social housing onto municipal governments (see Hackworth and Moriah, 2006). Lacking the revenue generation capacities to engage in social welfare provision, municipalities have been fiscally burdened by this download, and struggle to maintain deteriorating assets with steadily declining funding from upper levels of government. By the late-1990s, very little new rental housing of any kind –publicly subsidized or not – was being built, while demand continued to grow (see Walks, 2006).

In addition, state deregulation of tenant protections and rent control in the mid-1990s contributed to a growing crisis of affordability in Toronto. In 1997 a new *Tenant Protection Act* was introduced, replacing the *1992 Rent Control Act*. A central feature of the new Act was the introduction of "vacancy decontrol," which gave landlords new powers to raise rents on a vacant unit by any amount. Vacancy decontrol provided an enormous incentive for landlords to capitalize on the "rent gap" that had emerged between lower rents paid by sitting (often long-standing tenants), and the potentially much higher rents that could be achieved from higher-income renters, particularly in areas where gentrification had pushed up property values and rent levels (Slater, 2004). Furthermore, the Act allowed landlords to pass along certain costs to tenants by applying for an "Above-Guideline-Increase" (AGI), so that even in if a unit is not vacated, certain investments allow for substantial rent increases for sitting tenants.[2]

In Toronto, the effective withdrawal of both the state and the private sector from rental housing production – along with vacancy decontrol – created an enduring crisis in housing affordability. The city's vacancy rate (currently 1.6%) has largely stayed well below the "healthy" rate of 3% since the early 1990s – indicating a tight rental market. Vacancy decontrol has enabled dramatic rent increases in Toronto, with average rents in rents jumping by 20% (for 1- and 2-bedroom apartments), and 23% (for bachelor apartments) immediately

[1] We also conducted formal and informal interviews with industry stakeholders, community organizers, and tenant advocates, but our arguments in this paper derive from the public information noted above.

[2] Landlords can apply for an AGI if they have paid "extraordinary" utility costs, if they make significant capital investments, and if they invest in new security services, among other things.

after it was initiated, between 1997 and 2000 (Mahoney, 2001, 264). Weakened tenant protection led to a rapid increase in evictions, with many households evicted for lack of ability to pay rent (Mahoney, 2001; Shapcott, 2002). The impacts have disproportionately affected racialized households, immigrants, lone-parent families, and seniors – all of whom are more likely to rent and to live in high-rise towers (Stewart and Thorne, 2010). By 2015, 43.5% of renter households were paying more for rent than they could afford (i.e. over 30% of their income), and over 90,000 households were on the waiting list for social housing (City of Toronto, 2010, 2016).

The housing crisis, deregulation, and welfare state retrenchment created the perfect conditions for attracting private investors to multi-family housing in the 1990s. In addition, Canadian legislation in 1993 enabled the creation of REITs as new vehicles that would link disparate investors to profitable opportunities in real estate. REITs were originated in the United States in the 1960s as a way to remove barriers to real estate investment by allowing smaller investors to pool funds. REITs did not gain popularity, however, until 1986 tax code changes attracted investors, after which REITs became a key tool for institutional investment in US property markets, with total market capitalization growing from $8 billion to $26 billion between 1990 and 1993, and to $670 billion by 2013 (Hill, 2005, 28; Feng et al., 2011, 307). In Canada, REITs were launched "out of the ashes" of the real estate crash of the early 1990s (Koval and Knowling, 2013), created through collaboration between industry players and government as a replacement for failed investment vehicles of the 1980s, which had led to the bankruptcy and restructuring of industry giants like Olympia and York, and Cadillac Fairview (Perkins, 2013). The first Canadian REITs were restructured from open-ended trusts and publicly listed on stock exchanges, allowing investors access to real estate as easily as buying a stock. Institutional and other investors were quick converts, drawn by the advantageous tax structure, high yields, and stable distributions offered by REITs (Koval and Knowling, 2013). In 1997 and 1998, the first REITs to invest in multi-family rental housing were launched, at exactly the moment that the Province of Ontario set about to decontrol rents, deregulate tenant protections, and withdraw from social housing provision.

5. The financialization of rental housing in Toronto

The first wave of financialization of Toronto's multi-family rental housing sector was initiated to capitalize on the opportunities created by the collision of deregulation, downloading, and a spreading crisis in housing affordability among renters. Industry watcher Colliers International pointed specifically to Ontario's *1997 Tenant Protection Act* (*TPA*) for catalyzing a "major increase in demand" for multi-family housing at this time (2006, 1). Canadian Apartment Properties REIT (CAPREIT), Canada's first multi-family REIT, launched in 1997 and by 2015 had become Toronto's largest landlord (with at least 11,377 units in the City). CAPREIT pointed to the opportunity provided by the new Act in its 1997 prospectus, noting that "the potential relaxation of rent controls in the Province will create a supply and demand balance … beneficial to CAPREIT" (29). CAPREIT also noted that vacancy decontrol would "enable landlords to achieve market rents," especially in apartments where previous controls had kept rent levels substantially below "market rates" (Colliers International, 2006).

In 1998, Residential Equities REIT (ResREIT) was launched, with plans to acquire 27 Ontario properties "to more fully benefit from the anticipated relaxation of rent controls in Ontario, with legislation expected to be proclaimed in force in April 1998" (ResREIT, 1997, 4). Quite notably, ResREIT was launched by Dino Chiesa, Assistant Deputy Minister in the Housing Ministry during the time the *1997 Tenant Protection Act (TPA)* was conceived. Immediately after, he left public office and started ResREIT to directly profit from new opportunities for rental increases in legislation he helped to craft (Shapcott, 2002) – demonstrating the close links between state and industry actors, and their roles in facilitating capital accumulation through new financial channels.

Several private real estate companies (many that would later become REITs) also issued IPOs to access capital markets in the late 1990s, citing vacancy decontrol as a lure for investors. In 1997, Goldlist Properties, one of Toronto's biggest private landlords, went public after "working closely with the Ontario government" towards the "pivotal event" of the 1997 *TPA* (Goldlist, 1998, 5). In 2000, Goldlist noted that "the removal of rent controls from newly constructed and vacated apartments" provided a "major incentive" for owners to renovate their properties (7). In 1999, private real estate company InterRent went public in the reverse takeover of an extraction company (before converting into a REIT in 2007). Shifting from a focus on mining gold to mining profits in multi-family housing, the company intended "to take advantage of prevailing low mortgage rates and changes in rent control …" (Beaufort Hills, 1999, 9). By this time, vacancy decontrol had been in effect for a year, and InterRent's prospectus enticed investors by pointing to government data on the "substantial increase in 1998 rental rates" enabled by the *TPA* (Beaufort Hills, 1999, 11).

State withdrawal from social housing offered another incentive for investment in multi-family housing. CAPREIT, ResREIT, and InterRent all identified this as a positive force for reducing competition, tightening supply, and ensuring a pool of desperate tenants with few other choices. In IPO prospectuses, these firms used the same language:

> While the assisted sector has provided the bulk of supply over the past few years, in July 1995 the Ontario provincial government cancelled most of the non-profit and co-operative projects which had not yet started. As a result, the number of completions, which had been falling steadily, will be further reduced.
>
> CAPREIT (1997, 29), ResREIT (1998, 40), Beaufort Hills (1999, 9)

Tenant desperation was identified as an opportunity, with prospectus noting that "as units become more scarce … there is less choice and tenants have less ability to move" (CAPREIT, 1997, 29; ResREIT, 1998, 40, Beaufort Hills, 1999, 9).[3] In particular, REIT managers identified the constrained choices among new immigrants as a source of sustained demand, and therefore, of investor profit:

> This, combined with the steady flow of immigrants (who typically have low housing demands for several years after their arrival in Canada and are therefore more likely to live in rental apartment units for that period) should, in [the company's] opinion, result in relatively stable demand for rental units.
>
> CAPREIT, 1997, 29

5.1. Strategies of financialized landlords

Financialized landlords have adopted a range of strategies to maximize the profits that flow to investors. Among REITs, the objectives are typically clear: "to provide unitholders [i.e. shareholders] with stable and growing cash distributions, and to maximize unit [i.e. share] value via asset management and new acquisitions".[4] Colliers International outlined how these new players differ from the older breed of "mom and pop" owners, who "did not work single-mindedly to maximize the potential of their properties" (2006, 4). Financialized landlords have shifted from a focus on *property* to *asset* management – treating homes as financial assets that can be traded on international

[3] In 1999, housing advocacy groups released a report on the dire state of housing affordability in Ontario, and the growing crisis facing tenant families (Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association and the Cooperative Housing Federation of Canada, 1999). In its prospectus InterRent's management cited their findings on low vacancy rates and limited housing supply – not to condemn the crisis, but to make the case to investors that there were profits to be made in multi-family rental housing (1999, p. 9).

[4] These objectives can be found in the public listings of any multi-family REIT, this wording was taken from CAPREIT's (1997) prospectus (p. 3).

markets, and which are valued according to their yield to investors. For landlords, profits can derive from one of two sources – either from cost savings or revenue increases. Savings can be made by cutting costs (on maintenance and upkeep), and by investing to increase efficiency. With deep pockets and access to investor capital, financialized landlords can save money by finding efficiencies in property management – hiring third party managers for all properties or developing in-house teams. Savings are also made from bulk purchasing and contracts, and from investments in environmental and other upgrades that reduce costs.

The other major source of profits is increased revenues, which come directly from the pockets of tenants. Revenues may derive from the imposition of new charges for "ancillary fees" like parking or laundry, or by sub-metering utilities that were formerly included in rent. Most significantly, however, revenue is driven by increases in tenant rents, which can be achieved in three ways (in Ontario). First, for sitting tenants, rents can be increased each year according to a provincially set guideline amount. Second, increases above the guideline can be charged to existing tenants if a landlord makes investments and applies for an AGI. Third, and most lucratively, rent can be increased on a vacant unit upon turnover (by any amount), and if the unit is upgraded to a luxury standard in an area with high demand, the increase in rent may be very large indeed.

In Toronto, we have identified two general strategies that financialized landlords apply to extract value from multi-family portfolios, which we discuss in more detail below. In affordable buildings in lower-income post-war suburban neighbourhoods, revenues are *squeezed* from tenants and buildings, via AGIs, rent increases, increased ancillary costs, and building-wide efficiencies. With a reliable supply of desperate renters, landlords can be sure that tenants will absorb increased costs or be replaced, and can nudge rents higher upon unit turnover. The second general strategy is *gentrify-by-upgrading* - aggressively "repositioning" buildings in coveted areas with strong markets, transforming them from affordable into luxury buildings. Efforts are made to reposition buildings through landscaping and upgrading, and to hasten the removal of sitting tenants to allow for the renovation of their vacant suites – in order to attract a more affluent newcomer who will pay steeply increased rent. In some cases, such a repositioning strategy is coupled with a short-term investment focus and the flipping of repositioned buildings.

An early model of this latter strategy was provided by ResREIT. From 1998 until 2004 (when it was acquired by CAPREIT), ResREIT focused on acquiring buildings in higher-income "desirable areas of major cities where demand exceeds supply," with a goal to attract "young professionals, empty nesters, and active seniors" with "higher disposable incomes and active lives," seeking "convenience and lifestyle benefits in the heart of the city" (ResREIT, 1999, 9). ResREIT applied an aggressive repositioning strategy with plans to capture "the value made possible by new legislation in Ontario," and to "renovate suites and enhance revenue and resident satisfaction on suite turnover" (ResREIT, 1999). Our data showed that ResREIT targeted buildings in middle- or higher-income areas in mid-town Toronto, largely with stable or improving incomes – areas where lower-rent buildings could be transformed to meet the demand for upscale apartments. In its first year of operation, ResREIT raised average rents by 12% (compared to five percent in Toronto). From 1998 to 2003, rents rose in ResREIT's buildings by 26% (vs. 19% citywide), and rents in several buildings skyrocketed by more than 40% over the period.[5]

CAPREIT, meanwhile, used the *squeezing* strategy for extracting profits. Among its original acquisitions, many were in "affordable neighbourhoods that have a stable tenant population for which home ownership is not a practical alternative" (1997, 9), in which "current rents are below the legally permitted maximum rents." This presented an "opportunity for enhanced value through capital improvements which will lead to increased net rental income as vacancies are filled and tenant creditworthiness upgraded" (CAPREIT, 1997). In its affordable properties, small incremental rent increases often alone drive profits. Within one year, for example, rents on CAPREIT's buildings increased by an average of $49 per suite, yielding $437,129 to be shared among investors (CAPREIT, 2000).

6. The geography of post-crisis intensification and expansion

Although the GFC in 2008–2009 temporarily dampened investment in real estate, once the Canadian federal government and the Bank of Canada intervened to shore up the banks and the sector (see Walks, 2014b), the financialization of multi-family rental housing resumed and intensified. Key players like CAPREIT weathered the crisis with strong performance and growth, even viewing economic turmoil as beneficial – with tightened lending practices and intensified inequality generating steady demand for apartments (CAPREIT, 2009). By this time REITs had matured from fringe product to a reliable vehicle for profits, and multi-family residential had proven to be bankable, with CAPREIT proclaiming eagerly in the title of its 2010 annual report, "Listen to us: Apartments make money!"

After 2009, a series of new and aggressive financialized landlords entered the Toronto market, rapidly acquiring buildings and applying sophisticated asset management strategies. From 2000 to 2015, approximately 42% of the apartment stock in Toronto traded hands, with ownership increasingly consolidated in the hands of REITs, institutional investors, private equity funds, and (still a few) large family-owned companies (Colliers, 2015).[6] Much of this activity took place after 2009, with the dollar-volume of transactions dropping that year, but rising steeply to double pre-crisis levels in 2012, 2013, and 2015 (Vilner, 2016). By 2016 there were over 14 financialized landlords operating in the City of Toronto (see Table 1 for descriptions of each of these; see Table 2 for changes over time in firm activity), with over 44,000 apartment suites.[7] Private equity firms were among the most aggressive players to emerge post-GFC. Q Residential, for example, operated by private equity fund manager Conundrum Capital, entered Toronto in 2009 and by 2014 had bought 19 buildings with nearly 4000 suites. Timbercreek Asset Management, an investment firm, launched its first Canadian private equity real estate fund in 2007, and by 2015 had amassed 23 buildings in Toronto with over 2100 suites. Starlight Investments was launched in 2011, and by 2016 had become the city's second largest landlord with almost 8000 suites. While most players are domestic, Akelius (headquartered in Sweden) expanded into Canada in 2012, swiftly purchasing 37 buildings (3144 suites) in Toronto by 2016.

Post-crisis, financialized landlords adopted a series of locational strategies. Our analysis has revealed broad geographical patterns associated with these approaches, as well as shifts in emphasis post-GFC (Table 2). Some firms, such as InterRent,[8] focused almost exclusively on smaller and older apartment buildings, whereas others (including CAPREIT, TransGlobe, Centurion, and Morguard (REIT and Corporation)) have primarily targeted buildings constructed in the post-

[5] Calculated by the authors using data included in ResREIT's annual reports from 1998–2004. Data on city-wide average rents obtained from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation's (CMHC) Rental Market Housing Survey, on-line at https://www03.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/hmip-pimh/en/TableMapChart/Table?TableId=2.2.11&GeographyId=2270&GeographyTypeId=3&DisplayAs=Table&GeograghyName=Toronto).

[6] We were unable to locate information for previous periods with which to compare this rate of turnover. However, Colliers (2015) and other industry publications speak to the accelerated pace of apartment acquisitions in Toronto, particularly by REITs and other financialized investors, and our contacts suggest that this rate of turnover should be considered high in an historical context.

[7] As noted in the methods section, these figures should be considered very conservative estimates, as we only examined the largest corporate landlords for which public data is available.

[8] Prior to becoming a REIT in 2007 InterRent began to sell off many Toronto holding, by 2016 the REIT retained only two Toronto buildings.

Table 1
Selected Financialized Landlords in the Study, City of Toronto, 2015.
Source: Compiled by one of the authors.

Firm	Type	Launched	Buildings # 2015*	Approximate Units, 2015*	Details and History
Canadian Apartment Properties REIT (CAPREIT)	REIT, publicly-listed TSX:CAR.UN	1997	67	11,377	Canada's first apartment-oriented REIT and largest landlord.
Starlight Investments Limited	Real estate asset management and investment	2011	92	7967	Created by former TransGlobe CEO Daniel Drimmer, Starlight directly owns real estate and manages funds and REITs (including the former True North REIT)
Q Residential/Conundrum Capital	Private Equity Fund Management	2009	19	4637	Conundrum Capital manages private equity funds invested in real estate
GWL Real Estate Advisors (CREIF)	Asset and Fund Management	1981	15	3962	One of Canada's largest open-ended segregated real estate funds, managed by Great West Life.
bcIMC (British Columbia Investment Management Corp.)	Institutional Investor	1999	12	3583	One of Canada's largest institutional investors, investing on behalf of public sector clients in British Columbia.
Akelius Canada Limited	Foreign real estate firm	2012 (in Toronto)	37	3144	Registered as a Bahamian Foundation, Akelius has publicly-traded subsidiaries and is financed in part by its own deposit bank
Timbercreek Asset Management	Private Real Estate Investment FIrm	1999	23	2189	Owns private equity real estate and other vehicles, estimated entry into Toronto 2007
Morguard Corporation	Publicly-listed real estate company (TSX:MRC)	1997	5	2262	Morguard Corporation owns a commercial REIT, residential REIT, and directly held multi-family properties
Morguard North American Residential (NAR) REIT	REIT, publicly-listed TSX: MRG	2012	6	1937	Publicly-listed REIT launched in 2002 by Morguard Corporation, owning many former Goldlist Properties Ltd buildings
Centurion Apartment REIT	REIT, private	2010	16	1255	Created from two private apartment investment funds (Canadian Apartment Properties (CAP) LP I and II)
Realstar	Private real estate investment Firm	1974	20	2000+	One of Canada's largest owners of rental properties; manages several private equity real estate funds post 1997
InterRent REIT (formerly InterRent Properties Ltd.)	REIT, Publicly-listed TSX:INN.UN	1997	2 (was 19 in 2007)	166 (from 220 in 2007)	Formerly a publicly-listed real estate company; conversion to REIT in 2007; began reducing inventory in 2007
Selected Former Financialized Landlords investing in Toronto					
True North Apartment REIT	REIT, publicly-listed (TSX:TN)	2012–2015	5	413	Created by Starlight CEO Daniel Drimmer, merged in 2015 with Northern Properties REIT to create Northview REIT. Northview only owns one Toronto property.
TransGlobe Apartment REIT	REIT, public TSX:TGA	2010–2012	12	1908 (as of 2012)	Private company that went public in 1994, restructured into REIT in 2010, privatized and sold in 2012 (to Starlight and others)
Goldlist Properties Limited	Publicly-listed real estate company	1997–2002	9	3373 (as of 2002)	Former private company that issued IPO in 1997, absorbed by Morguard Corporation in 2001, many properties transferred to Morguard NAR REIT in 2012
Residential Equities REIT (ResREIT)	REIT, publicly listed TSX:REE.UN	1998–2002	29	5647 (as of 2004)	Created in 1998 from merging Greenwin and Lehndorf Tandem Properties Group, two private firms; sold in 2004 to CAPREIT

Only large corporate landlords with publicly-available information are included. Notes: (*) Numbers of buildings and units refer only to those located within the boundaries of the City of Toronto. For a small number of buildings, the number of units were not reported and could not be determined, and so are not included in the totals. Thus, these figures represent a conservative minimum estimate of the number of units.

Table 2
Urban Locations of Building Acquisitions, Pre- and Post-GFC.
Source: Compiled and calculated by the authors. Inner Area and Post-War Suburbs are defined in relation to the contiguous pre-1946 development boundary in Fig. 1.

Firm	Inner Area # (%)	Post-War Suburbs # (%)	Chi-Square Sig.	# (%) in Gentrifying Tracts[2]	Pre-1946 Buildings # (%)	Mean Year built[3]
1997–2009 (129 buildings)						
Inner City Focused						
GWL(CREIF)	13 (93%)	1 (7%)	**	1 (7%)	0	1967
InterRent	16 (88%)	2 (11%)	**	4 (36%)	10 (91%)	1906
ResREIT	21 (72%)	8 (28%)	**	4 (18%)	4 (14%)	1961
Realstar	15 (75%)	5 (25%)	*	6 (30%)	2 (10%)	1970
Morguard Corporation	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	(s)	1 (25%)	0	1987
Mixed/Suburban Focused						
BCIMC	6 (50%)	6 (50%)		2 (17%)	1 (8%)	1967
CAPREIT[1]	1 (4%)	22 (96%)	***	0	0	1965
Goldlist	1 (11%)	8 (89%)	*	0	0	1959
Sub-Total 1997–2009	*76 (59%)*	*53 (41%)*		*18 (14%)*	*17 (13%)*	
2009–2015 (228 buildings)						
Inner City Focused						
Akelius	33 (89%)	4 (11%)	***	15 (41%)	12 (32%)	1948
Timbercreek	18 (78%)	5 (22%)	**	8 (35%)	5 (22%)	1955
InterRent	0	1 (100%)	(s)	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	NA
Morguard Corporation	1 (100%)	0	(s)	1 (100%)	0	1984
Suburban Focused						
Starlight	29 (31%)	63 (69%)	***	8 (9%)	12 (13%)	1956
TransGlobe REIT	3 (25%)	9 (75%)		3 (25%)	0	1962
Q Residential	4 (21%)	15 (79%)	*	2 (11%)	1 (5%)	1968
True North REIT	1 (20%)	4 (80%)	(s)	0	0	1961
Morguard REIT (G)	0	6 (100%)	*	0	0	1970
CAPREIT	0	16 (100%)	***	0	0	1963
Centurion Apt REIT	0	16 (100%)	***	0	0	1963
Sub-Total 2009–2015	*89 (39%)*	*139 (61%)*		*39 (17%)*	*31 (14%)*	
TOTAL (357 buildings)	165 (46%)	192 (54%)		57 (16%)	48 (13%)	1959

Notes: (1) CAPREIT listings before 2009 do not include the buildings it purchased from ResREIT in 2004, which are listed separately. (G) Morguard REIT largely consists of properties that had been in the Goldlist portfolio. While GWL/CREIF, RealStar and BCIMC have continued operating their buildings in the post-2009 era, Goldlist was merged with the Morguard companies, and ResREIT was purchased by CAPREIT. (2) Gentrifying neighbourhoods are those identified in Walks and Maaranen (2008a,b) and in updated form in Walks (2014a,b) as either gentrified, gentrifying/incomplete gentrification, or potential future gentrification, by 2006 (the definition/identification of gentrification does not change between periods). (3) Mean year built is calculated only for the 89% of buildings for which the building year-built date was reported. Chi Square Significance of the city-suburban spatial distribution = $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. (s) Cell counts are too small to calculate Chi Square significance.



Fig. 1. Map showing Location of Multi-Family Rental Buildings Owned by Financialized Landlords in the Study, by Timing of Acquisition, City of Toronto. Notes: The City of Toronto was created in 1998 from the amalgamation of six lower-tier municipalities (the former cities of Toronto, York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough and the Borough of East York) and one upper-tier municipality (the Regional Municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto).
Source: Created by the authors.

Table 3
Mean Socio-Demographic Indicators of *Neighbourhoods* Containing each Firm.
Source: Calculated by the authors using the Census of Canada 2006. Unfortunately, the Government of Canada cancelled the long-form census in 2011, and so the most recent census containing this information is 2006.

Firm	Persons w/Low Income (%)	Families w/Children Under 6 (%)	Lone-Parent Families (%)	Seniors (%)	Foreign-Born (%)	Visible Minorities (%)
Inner City Focused						
ResREIT	22.8	**4.7***	**8.6***	12.4	**38.7***	**31.7***
InterRent	**39.7***	5.9	10.8	**9.7***	49.8	50.7
Realstar	28.3	5.2	12.7	13.4	43.6	39.1
GWL (CREIF)	24.7	4.6	**6.4***	11.1	45.9	**23.9***
Morguard Corporation	28.9	4.4	**4.0***	12.3	39.7	41.9
Timbercreek	26.8	5.1	**9.1***	12.8	45.4	**32.9***
Akelius	25.8	**4.8***	**8.9***	**11.4***	**38.7***	**31.1***
Suburban Focused						
CAPREIT	28.4	5.5	**13.0***	11.7	48.1	43.9
BCIMC	22.4	**4.1***	6.8*	15.6	40.7	32.7
True North REIT	25.8	6.2	13.8	13.3	50.9	48.4
TransGlobe REIT	**33.1***	5.6	11.8	15.9*	55.1	43.5
Q Residential	**35.6***	5.7	**14.5***	**10.9***	**58.3***	**59.5***
Centurion Apt REIT	**34.7***	**7.2***	13.3	13.2	54.9	**58.4***
Starlight	23.9	5.6	10.4	13.2	**44.4***	**32.1***
Morguard REIT	**35.9***	**8.1***	12.0	**8.5***	**64.7***	**73.3***
Goldlist	**34.2***	**7.4***	9.9	12.4	**60.1***	**61.3***
City of Toronto	25.0	5.4	11.6	13.1	47.7	42.7

Notes: **(*)** Statistically significantly different from the City of Toronto average, at the $p < 0.05$ level. Neighbourhoods are here defined as Census Tracts. CAPREIT data in this table is as of 2016, and thus includes their purchases of ResREIT's portfolio.

war era (Table 2). While some landlords (such as Starlight) have holdings city-wide, many others have tended to focus on either the suburbs (Q Residential, Centurion REIT, True North REIT, TransGlobe REIT, and Morguard REIT), or the inner city (Timbercreek, Akelius, bcIMC, and GWL) (see Fig. 1).

While the landscapes, building types, and property markets within the inner cities and suburbs are diverse, we have uncovered two broad strategies adopted by firms in our study, and each of these is tied to a very specific geography after 2009. Notably, suburban-focused firms often invest in buildings in ways that *squeeze* profits from existing tenants, while inner-city-focused firms typically use repositioning to *upgrade and gentrify* their units and tenant base, often leading to displacement.

6.1. *Strategy #1 – Squeezing*

The aggressive entry of financialized landlords into Toronto's multi-family sector post-2009 has involved efforts to "squeeze" greater profits from tenants and buildings in Toronto's suburban areas. While "squeezing" in this way is a practice often associated with absentee landlords or slumlords, financialized landlords *invest* in buildings in ways that will maximize profits, as well as cut costs. Although the investments made by such firms may, in some cases, benefit tenants, they always come with increased rents and costs (often through AGIs), and may be associated with harassment or reduced service. In addition, the gradual but steady increases in rents reduce affordability in formerly low-rent buildings, tightening the pressures faced by tenants in lower-income communities.

Centurion Apartment REIT (a private REIT), is representative of this geographical and business strategy. Launched in 2010, all of Centurion's acquisitions were in post-war suburban locations with above-average poverty rates, and in areas with significantly higher proportions of female lone-parent families and racialized groups (Table 3).[9] Centurion focuses on "undermanaged" lower-rent buildings in "outer lying areas," where "tenant demand for properties has increased over the years" (2016, 52). Once acquired, Centurion opts to increase rents and reduce operating expenses, but with a focus on a "lower- to middle- income renter" (Anderson, 2012, 22). Like Centurion, CAPREIT exemplifies the squeezing strategy post-2009. While CAPREIT owns "luxury" and "mid-tier" buildings as well, all post-GFC purchases have been in the post-war suburbs, where rent increases and investments to enhance profits are steadily applied.[10]

TransGlobe Apartment REIT (launched in 2010 before being privatized in 2012) predominantly held pre-1960s-era buildings in lower-income parts of the post-war suburbs (Table 2). In its previous incarnation as a private company (established in 1994), TransGlobe had become one of Canada's largest landlords, owning 26,500 suites in 2010 when it was taken public (TransGlobe, 2010). Notably, TransGlobe had developed a reputation for being a slumlord, racking up code violations and neglecting repairs (CBC, 2012). In its prospectus, management revealed a strategy for the REIT to further squeeze profits from its portfolio, calculating the "gain-to-lease" expected simply from increasing rents in its "affordable" properties. In the GTA alone, an increase from an average of $950 to $987 per month would yield $2.5 million each year (2010, 13), meaning the average tenant would transfer $444 of their own annual income to TransGlobe's investors with no change in housing quality. Revealing the spectacular profits to be made from the financialization of rental housing, investors in TransGlobe amassed a 60% return after only two years (Ruddy, 2013), at which time the REIT was taken private and its portfolio divided among other financialized landlords.

Morguard North American Residential REIT and Q Residential also have holdings in early post-war suburban areas with statistically-significant above-average proportions of racialized groups and poverty levels, and in the case of Q Residential, significantly higher concentrations of immigrants and female lone-parent families (Table 3). Like TransGlobe, Morguard's REIT (launched in 2012) evolved from a private company (Goldlist Properties). The REIT's plan in its prospectus

[9] Centurion Apartment REIT was created from the portfolio of a private real estate equity fund (Canadian Apartment Properties Fund I) that was launched in 2006 by Gregory Romundt, who became the CEO of Centurion.

[10] Indeed, by 2010 CAPREIT noted that its steady program of rent increases had led to the reclassification of six "affordable" buildings to "mid-tier," and two of its "mid-tier" buildings to "luxury" status (2010, p. 5).

was to squeeze more profits from rents, calculating that an annual "gain to lease" of $2.8 million that could be realized by incrementally raising existing rents to what they deem as the "potential rents" across its portfolio (2012, 35).[11] Q Residential (owned by Conundrum Capital), for its part, focuses on "energy efficiency and cost control as a key part of their strategy to deliver superior returns to investors, primarily pension funds" (Alty, 2010). While investors see high monthly distributions, tenants in Q Residential's buildings view the company as a slumlord, pointing to higher costs and worsened living conditions (Shah, 2013). Staging a protest 2013, tenants reported that Q Residential had removed storage lockers, neglected maintenance, and intended to impose new charges for air conditioning, visitor parking, and light bulbs (Shah, 2013).

6.2. Strategy #2 –Displacement, upgrading, and gentrification

The *gentrification-by-upgrading* strategy is based on aggressively repositioning repositioning buildings and transforming their tenant base, sometimes with a goal to flip for short-term capital gains. Largely (but not solely) applied in inner-city areas, this strategy has been particularly popular among private equity and asset management firms that entered Toronto's rental market since 2009. Firms like Akelius and Timbercreek have acquired buildings in pre-WWII inner-city areas (Table 2), notably in tracts with fewer members of visible minorities (Table 3). The inner city is, of course, the zone where battles over gentrification are occurring. The middle column in Table 2 shows the number (and proportion) of buildings in each firm's portfolio that are located in neighbourhoods identified by Walks (2014a, updated from Walks and Maaranen 2008a,b), as experiencing some form of gentrification. In total, 57 buildings acquired by the firms we've studied are in such neighbourhoods, with the majority (39, or 68%) having been acquired since 2009. Furthermore, for firms with an explicitly inner-city focus, roughly 24% of acquisitions made before 2009 (16 buildings) are found in neighbourhoods experiencing some form of gentrification, while post-crisis, the proportion more than doubled to 49% (26 buildings),[12] indicating a growing interest in buying buildings in gentrifying areas. Perhaps associated with this trend, applications for AGIs jumped more than 800% (from 16 to 130) between 2011 and 2014 in inner city Toronto (Leon, 2015).

Timbercreek Asset Management is one firm that has actively sought to capitalize on gentrification pressures, and to forcibly gentrify its own buildings. Timbercreek was founded in 1999 to cater to institutions with capital in the range of $5 to 25 billion seeking to invest in real estate (I & PE Real Estate, 2015). Its first multi-family investment funds were used to purchase US buildings, with a strategy to "buy solid, neglected properties in good markets, spruce them up, and sell a few years later" (Brent, 2015). According to founder Ugo Bizarri, Timbercreek's approach is like a "carwash," in which "on the front end, you put a multi-res asset that, in our view, has not been operated to its full potential, and about two and a half years later it comes out the other end looking squeaky clean and ready for an institutional buyer to acquire it" (O'Dea and Shwartz, 2014). In 2007 the company adapted this strategy to Canada, launching its first Canadian multi-family fund (which posted an internal rate of return of 20%), and its second and third such funds in 2008 and 2011 (Dmetrieva, 2015).

Timbercreek's Canadian "value-add strategy … capitalizes on mismanaged/distressed" properties, investing in "building envelope enhancements, suite renovations, repositioning in the market place, and sequential material increases in rental rates" (Canadian Newswire, 2011). In selecting sites, the company explicitly targets buildings in areas that are gentrifying or subject to future gentrification pressures. According to Bizarri: "the opportunity is in finding a local market that is getting gentrified, and make an investment to create core [stable, income-generating] properties" (O'Dea and Schwartz-Driver, 2014). By systematically renovating units and charging higher rents to new tenants, Timbercreek forcibly gentrifies its own buildings, contributing to the displacement of lower-income tenants and to intensified patterns of gentrification in the areas targeted for its acquisitions.

Akelius has similarly adopted a business model capitalizing on gentrification pressures. According to CEO Pal Ahlsen, the company's focus is on: "upgrading our properties to first class. What that means is that every time we get a vacant apartment – when a tenant moves out – we move in with our handicraft firms to upgrade this apartment to what we call First Class" (Nasdaq OMX Nordic, 2014). In Akelius's Toronto buildings, these "first class" units achieve, on average, 39% higher rents after renovation (Akelius, 2013, 32). Prior to displacement tenants are also subjected to rent increases, which Akelius calls "adjusting the rent of sitting tenants," and which contributes to a quarter of their earnings from rent increases (Akelius, 2013). Like Timbercreek, Akelius's local team strategically "cherry picks" properties in gentrifying communities, and has calculated what can be considered a gentrification bonus – finding that SEK22 million (or CAD$77 million) was earned in 2013 simply from "cherry picking" the right location, and not due to rent increases or inflation (Akelius, 2013, 16). As of late 2014, 19% of the units owned by Akelius had been upgraded to "first class" implying that after two years, nearly one in five existing tenants may have been displaced to make way for people who could afford higher rents.[13]

Like Timbercreek and Akelius, Starlight Investments Limited has developed well-oiled programs for "repositioning" buildings on an assembly-line basis. Starlight was created in 2011 by the CEO of the former TransGlobe Apartment REIT, Daniel Drimmer, acquiring many of the former REIT's properties, and expanding from 5500 suites nationwide to 25,000 in 2016. The company also represents the evolution and growing sophistication of financialized landlords in Canada, with a "platform" for real estate investment including public vehicles (True North Commercial REIT and the former True North Apartment REIT), publicly-traded funds (U.S. Multi-Family Core Funds I, II, III, IV, V), international joint ventures, and private holdings. Starlight focuses exclusively on "asset management," with property management handled by third parties.[14] According to its website, different profit-making strategies are applied in different areas. For buildings in areas with "strong markets" the company targets "underperforming or undercapitalized" properties and imposes a three-pronged "value-add" program, which involves capital investment in building upgrades, "the application of rigorous operational standards and controls to manage and reduce costs," and "the pursuit of ancillary revenue opportunities and maximization of rental rates" (Starlight, 2016a). Meanwhile, in "stable" (rather than "strong") markets, Starlight does not invest in upgrades, but squeezes profits from buildings through cost reductions, and increases in ancillary revenues and rents (2016b).

[11] Morguard Corporation (established in a reverse takeover of an automotive company 1997) acquired a major interest in the publicly-traded Goldlist Properties in 1997, and in 2002 took control of the company, later taking it private as Morguard Residential Inc. In 2012, Morguard Corporation (TSX:MRC) created Morguard North American Residential REIT (TSX:MRG), and transferred some of the former Goldlist properties to the REIT, while retaining some under direct ownership by the corporation (MRC). As such, some of Morguard's properties are held by the Corporation, others by its REIT. Morguard also operates a commercial REIT, called Morguard REIT.

[12] These estimates should be seen as conservative since they are based on gentrification indices constructed using census data from the Census of Canada between 1971 and 2006, such that all neighbourhoods identified as gentrifying here were so identified as of 2006. Thus, we are using a constant denominator of the same number or gentrifying neighbourhoods here for all analysis. We would have liked to conduct further analysis of the spread of gentrification since 2006, but unfortunately, the former Conservative-led federal government cancelled the 2011 long-form census which would have allowed for identification of gentrification post-2006.

[13] This figure was calculated from data on Akelius's website that has since been removed. The data referred to 2100 suites in 31 buildings, of which 392 (i.e. 19%) had been upgraded to first class.

[14] In Toronto these property managers include Greenwin Inc., Metcap Living, Sterling Karamar Property Management, and Cogir Management Corporation.

Starlight's evolution highlights the adaptive nature of capital in profiting from multi-family housing. The company's CEO began by launching a private real estate company in 1994 (TransGlobe property management), which gained notoriety nation-wide as a slumlord (CBC, 2012), for its strategy of disinvesting in and milking properties for profit. As a REIT (2010–2012), the company gained access to investor capital and further squeezed profits from its (largely) inner-suburban landholdings. Finally, as a diversified Asset Manager (post-2012), Starlight invests substantial capital to transform its "underperforming" assets into gentrified buildings for a more affluent tenant base.

6.3. Repositioning spatial inequality: Restructuring the social geography of the city

The financialization of rental housing has impacts that affect tenants and patterns of socio-spatial polarization in the city. Investing in multi-family housing has been highly lucrative for financialized landlords that have penetrated the sector in Toronto beginning in the 1990s. The Canadian Real Estate Investment Fund I (CREIF), for example, operated by GWL Real Estate Advisors, posted stable returns of 4.65% in 2015, with the highest returns (10.1%) from multi-family properties (CREIF, 2015). In 2015, Canadian multi-family REITs were forecast to return 18.6% in 2016 (Rothschild et al., 2016).[15]

The rising profits that accrue to investors from these practices come at a price, and that price is first and foremost paid for by tenants in affected multi-family housing. Not only do tenants pay directly via higher rent and fees, but also, in some cases, through reduced quality of life. For instance, tenant experiences in buildings bought by Akelius, which have been well-reported in the Toronto media, demonstrate how efforts to cut costs, boost revenues, and "reposition" buildings play out in tenants' lives (see Gallant, 2014a,b; Spurr, 2014). The company has been criticized for firing live-in superintendents, replacing them with an unresponsive call centre, and neglecting maintenance and repairs on the units of existing tenants. At the same time, residents reported enduring lengthy construction projects, frequent water and power shut-offs, frequent (often illegal) unit entry, and disruptive practices bordering on harassment (including the choice to wrap a building in green tarp for ten months).[16] Tenants were also issued rent increases – at one building, Akelius applied for back-to-back AGIs of 4.1% in 2014 and 4.6% in 2015, well above the guideline increases (of 0.8 and 1.6% respectively) allowed by the Ontario government.[17] Tenants in that building, many of whom are Tibetan refugee families, reported feeling pressured to move out (CBC News, 2015). In addition to these types of hardships, tenants pay through displacement. Displacement is built into the business model of many financialized landlords, who pursue vacancies to achieve large rent increases upon turnover. While the aim to remove existing tenants is rarely acknowledged plainly, companies have euphemisms for their plans to replace lower-rent paying residents by attracting "higher class" (Centurion, 2016, 52), "first class" (Akelius, 2013), and "more creditworthy" (CAPREIT, 1997, 9) tenants, or to correct "occupational deficiencies" (Morguard, 2012, 29).

Furthermore, a price is paid by the entire city, as lower-income tenants are displaced from accessible and formerly-affordable but now gentrifying areas, and compelled to move to less-accessible lower-rent apartments. Thus, the two broad strategies we identified can be seen to work both sides of this spatial process, in turn hastening both the level of neighbourhood income segregation, and the restructuring of inner-city and suburban functions. In general, those firms mainly following the *squeezing* strategy have targeted the post-war suburbs for most of their investments (Table 2), many of which have declining incomes (Table 4) (for discussion of income decline in Toronto's inner suburbs, see Walks, 2001; Hulchanski, 2007). The targeting of these areas by financialized landlords has quickened its pace since 2009, with firms like Centurion, Q Residential, and CAPREIT buying up aging high-rises at a rapid pace.

Many firms initiating *gentrification-by-upgrading,* and following a transparent strategy to replace lower-income with more affluent tenants, have not only located within neighourhoods that have seen income increases (many of which are by now largely gentrified), but also formerly-disinvested neighbourhoods where incomes had been decreasing (Table 4). This strategy has intensified post-2009, with the entry of new firms such as Akelius, Timbercreek, and Starlight. There are still some lower-income neighbourhoods in Toronto's largely-gentrified inner city that have not experienced rising average incomes – largely due to the presence of aging high-rise rental apartments which had not previously been expected to gentrify as these are difficult to convert to owner-occupied housing (i.e. "condoized") in Toronto due to public policies enacted by the City (Hulchanski, 2007). However, our research shows that gentrification has, particularly post-crisis, spread

Table 4
Pre- and Post- GFC Building Acquisitions by Local Neighbourhood Income Trajectory between 2000 and 2010.
Source: Calculated by the authors using income data from the 2001 Census of Canada and custom 2010 data purchased from Environics Analytics.

Firm	Improving Incomes # (%)	Stable Incomes # (%)	Declining Incomes # (%)
1997–2009			
Inner City Focused	*51 (60%)*	*16 (19%)*	*18 (21%)*
GWL (CREIF)	9 (64%)	5 (36%)	0
InterRent	11 (61%)	4 (22%)	3 (17%)
ResREIT	16 (55%)	5 (17%)	8 (28%)
Realstar	14 (74%)	2 (11%)	3 (16%)
Morguard Corporation	1 (25%)	0	3 (75%)
Mixed/Suburban Focused	*14 (32%)*	*13 (30%)*	*17 (38%)*
BCIMC	7 (58%)	2 (17%)	3 (25%)
CAPREIT[1]	5 (22%)	8 (35%)	10 (43%)
Goldlist	2 (22%)	3 (33%)	4 (44%)
Sub-Total 1997–2009	*65 (50%)*	*29 (22%)*	*35 (27%)*
2009–2015			
Inner City Focused	*30 (48%)*	*16 (26%)*	*16 (26%)*
Akelius	20 (54%)	6 (16%)	11 (30%)
Timbercreek	8 (35%)	10 (43%)	5 (22%)
InterRent	1 (100%)	0	0
Morguard Corporation	2 (100%)	0	0
Suburban Focused	*63 (38%)*	*36 (22%)*	*67 (40%)*
CAPREIT	4 (25%)	2 (12%)	10 (63%)
Starlight	45 (49%)	22 (24%)	25 (27%)
TransGlobe REIT	4 (33%)	5 (42%)	3 (25%)
Q Residential	6 (32%)	1 (5%)	12 (63%)
True North REIT	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	2 (40%)
Morguard REIT (G)	2 (33%)	2 (33%)	2 (33%)
Centurion Apt REIT	1 (6%)	2 (13%)	13 (81%)
Sub-Total 2009–2015	93 (41%)	52 (23%)	83 (36%)
Total All Years	155 (45%)	81 (23%)	111 (32%)

Notes: Improving incomes here represent those in which the ratio of average household income in a census tract (neighbourhood) to the metropolitan average household income improved by more than 2.5 percentage points between 2000 and 2010. Declining incomes represent those in which the ratio of average household income in a census tract (neighbourhood) to the metropolitan average household income declined by more than 2.5 percentage points. Stable incomes are those in which the ratio of the tract average household income to the metropolitan average changed by 2.5 percentage points or less, over the 2000–2010 period. ([1])CAPREIT before 2009 does not include the buildings it purchased from ResREIT in 2004. (G) Mortguard REIT largely consists of properties that had been in the Goldlist portfolio.

[15] This forecast was based on an examination of Boardwalk REIT, CAPREIT, InterRent REIT, Killam REIT, Mainstreet Equity Corporation, Northview Apartment REIT, and Pure Multi-family REIT, not all of which are active in Toronto (see Rothschild et al. 2016 for more information).

[16] Many of these details were learned by one of the co-authors in attending a public event to host city-wide tenants of Akelius buildings, and by attending tenant association meetings in certain Akelius properties.

[17] Through a concerted organization effort, tenants were able to fight against these AGIs and received a lower rent increase.

beyond traditional forms by which older houses or lofts are converted to owner-occupation or condominium units (see Walks and Maaranen, 2008a for discussion of these different forms of gentrification in Toronto). Financialized firms have innovated ways to overcome the barriers to profitably gentrify multi-family rental housing which cannot be converted to owner-occupation, which explains why a number of their investments are in rental neighbourhoods with still-declining incomes. Even neighbourhoods with aging rental apartment towers are now under threat of gentrification in the inner city.

Displaced tenants have limited options in the gentrifying inner city, and while there is no direct data on where households move, circumstantial evidence from local activist organizations as well as some limited academic scholarship (Paradis et al., 2014; Walks and Bourne, 2006) suggests that they may have little choice but to move to high-rise apartments in Toronto's early post-war (inner) suburbs. This has meant rising profits for those financialized landlords who can capitalize on this lack of choice among renters. Indeed, while our sample of financialized landlords more than doubled the number of building assets they held in the inner city after 2009 (from 76 to 165 buildings), they almost *quadrupled* the number of building assets they held in the post-war suburbs (from 53 to 192 buildings). Displacement of rental housing, and lower-income renters, from the inner city has itself become big business, both for those firms whose business model involves finding ways of displacing their own tenants (so as to facilitate upgrading) as well as those whose business model involves extracting profits from the displaced households they are taking in. Displacement is therefore a key process upon which the *squeezing* strategy is then capitalized in the value of REITs and the equities attached to them.

In this way, the activities of financialized landlords speed up and intensify processes of *both* inner-city gentrification, *and* the decline of older post-war suburban areas. Indeed, these two processes could be said to mutually constitute each other, and some firms, such as Starlight, have invested in both strategies simultaneously. As tenants are increasingly squeezed in aging post-war suburban buildings, discretionary incomes decline, local retail withers, and effective aggregate demand within the neighbourhood declines. Meanwhile in the inner city, displaced lower-income tenants have fewer options for where to rent, forcing them to accept squeezing strategies in declining neighbourhoods, which are dominated by aging high-rise towers in the post-war suburbs (Paradis et al., 2014). In this way, financialized landlords are augmenting the restructuring of Toronto's social geography, extracting profit from both the geographic migration of lower-income tenants out of the core and into the suburbs, and from the creation of new space for higher-income tenants in the inner city.

7. Conclusion

While much of the literature since the GFC has focused on the financialization of home-ownership, the financialization of rental housing is playing an important a role in restructuring the social geography of the city. Although private landlords have always sought to maximize profits paid by tenants, financialization has encouraged new and distinct business strategies, both those that expand the processes by which value is extracted as well as those that quicken and intensify processes of uneven geographic development. Financialization can thus been seen to speed up what Smith (1984) termed the "see-saw" of capitalism, in which capital tends to invest in areas with high profit margins, only to experience diminishing returns as competition erodes local advantages of place. This pushes investment elsewhere – abandoning, for example, the inner city for the suburbs – until some future time at which it see-saws back when the original location becomes profitable again, as in the case of gentrification. Disinvestment and neglect are central to this process, for their role in producing buildings and neighbourhoods that become ripe for profitable reinvestment. In Toronto, reinvestment in multi-family housing after decades of decline represents the see-saw of capital back into this formerly-disinvested sector and disinvested parts of the city. This shift was enabled by neoliberal state policies to withdraw from social housing, deregulate rental protections, and decontrol rents – creating new landscapes of opportunity to profit from tenant desperation and the affordability crisis. In addition, state and industry collaboration enabled the creation of new vehicles to overcome barriers to investment in multi-family housing, linking disparate and geographically-dispersed investors to previously un-tappable local real estate markets, and creating new capital-rich landlords with the capacity to expand, concentrate ownership, and aggressively manage and reposition portfolios in new ways. This is re-spatializing processes of urban restructuring in ways that confound established understandings of centres and peripheries, and producing new avenues for profiting from the spatial re-distribution of lower-income renters.

Toronto has experienced particularly intense financial penetration into its multi-family housing stock in the aftermath of global financial crisis. Perhaps ironically, this was further facilitated by federal government interventions that reduced borrowing costs, prevented a real estate correction, and boosted employment in Toronto where banks and mortgage finance firms are headquartered (see Walks, 2014b). Not only has this fuelled rising inequality and segregation of wealth (Walks, 2016), but financialization within Toronto's rental housing sector has been associated with a cluster of spatial strategies that have worked both to drive gentrification and displacement in inner urban districts, through upgrading and aggressive repositioning, and to speed up the ongoing concentration of tenants with lower discretionary incomes in the post-war suburbs, already jump-started by de-industrialization and the suburbs' newfound role as the main immigrant-reception areas of the post-modern city. One result is that renters located in the inner suburbs are increasingly compelled to send a greater share of their incomes to rentiers residing in other neighbourhoods, cities, and even nations.

It is notable that in Toronto, the financialization of rental housing initially emerged from locally-based domestic firms and actors, who adapted to a favourable policy and global economic context to capitalize on local opportunities in new ways. The first multi-family REITs were started from existing private companies and by seasoned industry players. With the exception of foreign firm Akelius, large financialized landlords in Toronto are largely domestic in origin, many with roots in Ontario, and some with roots in other industries (it is metaphorically ironic that one of these derives from the takeover of a company originally specialized in mining, thus shifting from the extraction of minerals to the extraction of rents). Since 1997, these firms have evolved, adapted, and grown in size, sophistication, and complexity. In turn, their activities are reshaping the sector, as non-financialized firms (such as MetCap Living or Hollyburn) are pressured (or inspired) through the need to compete for investors, to adopt similar repositioning, displacing, and squeezing strategies. While financialization in the global economy certainly enabled this trend in Toronto, the reach of finance capital into the multi-family sector was partly driven by government policies and industry adaptations that are largely home grown. As such, when we consider the socially-inequitable outcomes that are related to these processes, it is locally-driven policy changes and initiatives that could mitigate displacement, enhance security of tenure, and encourage investment in housing in ways that do not lead to gentrification.

Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), through both a faculty Insight Grant (Dr. Alan Walks), and a SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship (Dr. Martine August). The authors wish to thank SSHRC for their generous support. The authors would also like to thank the reviewers for their helpful suggestions.

References

Aalbers, M., 2008. The financialization of home and the mortgage market crisis. Compet. Change 12 (2), 148–166.
Aalbers, M., 2016. The Financialization of Housing: A Political Economy Approach. Routledge, New York.
Akelius, 2013. Annual Report, 2013. Retrieved August 01, 2014 from: < https://www.akelius.com/financial-information/reports > .
Alty, L., 2010. Case study – Conundrum Capital drives down energy usage. Webpage on EnergyEfficiency.com. Retrieved November 16, 2016 from: < http://www.ee-solutions.com/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=23 > .
Anderson, N., 2012. One deal at a time. Canadian Apartment Magazine. August.
Arrighi, G., 1994. The Long Twentieth Century. Verso, London.
Beaufort Hills Resources Inc., 1999. Information Circular Management Solicitation. Retrieved June 20, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Beswick, J., Alexandr, G., Byrne, M., Vives-Miro, S., Fields, D., Hodkinson, S., Jonoschka, M., 2016. Speculating on London's housing future. City 20 (2), 321–341.
Boyer, R., 2000. The political in the era of globalization and finance: focus on some regulation school research. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 24, 274–322.
Brent, P., 2015, May 04. Timbercreek ready for second U.S. Apartment Foray. Property Biz Canada. On-line: < www.renx.ca/timbercreek-ready-second-u-s-apartment-foray/ > .
Canadian News Wire, 2011, August 03. Timbercreek closes third Opportunity Fund at $100 million committed capital. On-line: < http://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/timbercreek-closes-third-opportunity-fund-at-100-million-committed-capital-508627581.html > .
CAPREIT, 2010. Annual Report, 2010. Retrieved August 01, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
CAPREIT, 2009. Annual Report, 2009. Retrieved August 01, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
CAPREIT, 2000. Annual Report, 2000. Retrieved July 15, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
CAPREIT, 1997. Prospectus May 12, 1997. Toronto: CAPREIT. Retrieved June 20, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Canadian Real Estate Investment Fund [CREIF], 2015. Annual Report, 2015. Available on-line at: < http://www.gwlrealtyadvisors.com/Portals/0/Funds/GWLRA-AR%202015_ENG%20FINAL.pdf > .
CBC News, 2015, March 23. Parkdale residents protest back-to-back rent increases by Akelius. CBC News Online. < http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/parkdale-residents-protest-back-to-back-rent-increases-by-akelius-1.3005265 > .
CBC News, 2012, January 20. Tenants lose as landlord TransGlobe racks up charges. CBC News Online: < http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/tenants-lose-as-landlord-TransGlobe-racks-up-charges-1.1246084 > .
Centurion Apartment REIT, 2016. Offering Memorandum. Retrieved September 11, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Christophers, B., 2016. The limits to financialization. Dialog. Human Geogr. 5 (2), 183–200.
City of Toronto, 2016. Quick facts about homelessness and social housing in Toronto. On-line: < http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=f59ed4b4920c0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=d0eeab2cedfb0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD > .
City of Toronto, 2010. Housing Opportunities Toronto: An Affordable Housing Action Plan, 2010–2020. City of Toronto, Toronto.
Clarke, T., 2014. The impact of financialisation on international corporate governance: maximising shareholder value. Law Financial Markets Rev. 8 (1), 39–51.
Clayton Research Associates, 1990. The Evolution of the Housing Industry in Canada 1946–1986. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Ottawa.
Colliers International, 2015. Apartment Market Trends: 2015, Multifamily, GTA. Colliers International, Toronto. Accessed online at: < www.collierscanada.com/~/media/Files/Offices/Toronto/2015%20Multifamily%20Newsletter.ashx > .
Colliers International, 2006. Greater Toronto Apartment Market Trends, February 2006. Colliers International, Toronto.
Dmetrieva, K., 2015, February 26. 'Divorcee towers' makeover leading Toronto rental rebirth. Bloomberg Business. On-line: < www.bloomberg.com/new/articles/2015-02-26/divorcee-towers-makeover-leading-torontos-rental-rebirth > .
Epstein, G., 2005. Financialization and the World Economy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Froud, J., Haslam, C., Johal, S., Williams, K., 2000. Shareholder value and financialization: consultancy promises, management moves. Econ. Soc. 29 (1), 80–110.
Feng, Z., McKay Price, S., Sirmans, C., 2011. An overview of real estate investment trusts (REITs): 1993–2009. J. Real Estate Literat. 19 (2), 307–343.
Fields, D., 2014. Contesting the financialization of urban space: community organizations and the struggle to preserve rental housing in New York City. J. Urban Affairs 37 (2), 144–165.
Fields, D., Uffer, S., 2016. The financialisation of rental housing: a comparative analysis of New York City and Berlin. Urban Stud. 53 (7), 1486–1502.
Gallant, J., 2014a, July 23. Parkdale tenants accuse firm of ignoring repairs in a bid to push them out. Toronto Star. Business.
Gallant, J., 2014b, August 18. Tenants taking Akelius to Landlord and Tenant Board. Toronto Star. Business.
Goldlist Properties Inc., 2000. Annual Report, 2000. Retrieved September 11, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Goldlist Properties Inc., 1998. Annual Report, 1998. Retrieved September 11, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Gotham, K., 2009. Creating liquidity out of spatial fixity. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 33 (2), 355–371.
Haila, A., 2016. Urban Land Rent: Singapore as Property State. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Hackworth, J., Moriah, A., 2006. Neoliberalism, contingency, and urban policy: the case of social housing in Ontario. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 30 (3), 510–527.
Hill, T., 2005. The securitization of security: Regorganization of land, military, and state in the Pentagon's back yard. J. Urban History 41 (1), 75–92.
Hulchanski, D., 2007. The Three Cities in Toronto. University of Toronto Centre for Urban and Community Studies/Cities Centre. Research Bulletin No. 41.
I & PE Real Estate [No Author], 2015. Canada: Exporting expertise. I & PE Real Estate Magazine. March/April. On-line: < https://realestate.ipe.com/markets-/regions/americas/canada-exporting-expertise/10007046.article > .
Koval, P., Knowling, S., 2013. Real Estate Investment Trusts. Toronto: Torys LLP. On-line at: < www.torys.com/insights/publications/2013/06/real-estate-investment-trusts > .
Krippner, G., 2005. The financialization of the American Economy. Socio-Econ. Rev. 3, 173–208.
Lees, L., Slater, T., Wyly, E., 2008. Gentrification. Routledge, New York.
Leon, S., 2015. Recent trends in rents, affordability, and up-scaling in apartment buildings in Toronto's South Parkdale. Unpublished manuscript.
Mahoney, E., 2001. The ontario tenant protection ac: a trust betrayed. J. Law Social Policy 16, 261–278.
Morguard North American Residential REIT, 2012. Prospectus date April 12, 2012. Retrieved September 15 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Nasdaq OMX Nordic, 2014, June 5. Akelius Residential AB [Press Release and Video interview with Aklius CEO Pål Ahlsén]. Available on-line at: < http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/news/listings/firstnorth/2014/akelius > .
O'Dea, C., Schwartz-Driver, S., 2014. City focus Toronto: Cranes on the skyline. I & PE Magazine. March/April. On-line: < http://realestateipe.com/markets-/city-focus-toronto-cranes-on-the-skyline/10001301.article > .
Paradis, E., Wilson, R.M., Logan, J., 2014. Nowhere Else to Go: Inadequate Housing & Risk of Homelessness Among Families in Toronto's Aging Rental Buildings. University of Toronto, Cities Centre. Research Report 231. Accessed online at: < http://media.wix.com/ugd/672989_feec11cf45ca42f298842f71056c89d8.pdf > .
Perkins, T., 2013, Sept. 23. REITs evolve, earn, and seek new avenues for growth. Globe & Mail. On-line: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/property-report/reits-evolve-earn-and-seek-new-avenues-for-growth/article14481174/ > .
ResREIT [Residential Equities REIT], 1999. Annual Report, 1999. Retrieved April 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
ResREIT [Residential Equities REIT], 1998. Prospectus for Initial Public Offering, dated January 28, 1998. Retrieved June 20, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Rolnik, R., 2013. Late neoliberalism: the financialization of homeownership and housing rights. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 37 (3), 1058–1066.
Rosen, G., Walks, A., 2015. Castles in Toronto's Sky: condoism as urban transformation. J. Urban Affairs 85 (1), 39–66.
Rothschild, M., Roy, N., Dukesz, N., 2016 January 06. 2016 Real Estate Outlook.
Ruddy, E., 2013. Blazing new trails: Starlight investments team is on a mission. Canadian Apartment Magazine. November. Globe and Mail. On-line: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/investment-ideas/research-reports/article28079098.ece/BINARY/2016+REIT+Outlook.pdf > .
Shah, M., 2013, June 08. Thorncliffe residents protest living conditions. Toronto Sun. On-line: < http://www.torontosun.com/2013/06/08/thorncliffe-park-residents-protest-living-conditions > .
Shapcott, M., 2002. Profiting from a manufactured housing crisis. Ontario Alternative Budget Technical Paper #5. Toronto: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/Ontario.
Slater, T., 2004. Municipally managed gentrification in South Parkdale, Toronto. Canadian Geogr. 48 (3), 303–325.
Soederberg, S., 2014. Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry. Routledge, London.
Spurr, B., 2014. New Rent Monster. NOW Mag. 33(48).
Starlight Investments Limited, 2016a. Targeting underperforming and undercapitalized buildings in strong markets. Webpage available at: < http://www.starlightinvest.com/investment-vehicles/canada-multi-family/multi-family-value-add/ > .
Starlight Investments Limited, 2016b. Capitalizing on quality and stability to deliver returns. Webpage available at; < http://www.starlightinvest.com/investment-vehicles/canada-multi-family/multi-family-core/ > .
Stewart, G., Thorne, J., 2010. Tower neighborhood renewal in the Greater Golden Horseshoe: an analysis of high-rise apartment tower neighborhoods developed in the post-war boom (1945–1984). E.R.A. Architects, planningAlliance, City of Toronto Cities Centre, Toronto.
Suttor, G., 2016. Still Renovating: A History of Canadian Social Housing Policy. McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal-Kingston.
Smith, N., 1984. Uneven development: Nature, capital, and the production of space. The University of Georgia Press, Athens.
Teresa, B., 2015. Managing fictitious capital: the legal geography of investment and political struggle in rental housing in New York City. Environ. Plan. A 46 (3), 465–484.
TransGlobe Apartment REIT, 2010. Initial Public Offering Prospectus, May 7th, 2010. Retrieved June 20, 2016 from < www.sedar.ca > .
Vilner, R., 2016. GTA Multi-Residential Market Summary. Canadian Apartment Magazine. January.
Walks, A., 2016. Homeownership, asset-based welfare, and the neighbourhood segregation of wealth. Housing Stud. 31 (7), 755–784.
Walks, A., 2014a. Gentrification, social mix, and the immigrant-reception function of inner-city neighbourhoods: Evidence from Canadian globalizing cities. In: Good, K.R., Turgeon, L., Triadafilopoulos, T. (Eds.), Segmented Cities? How Urban Contexts

Shape Ethnic and Nationalist Politics. UBC Press, Vancouver, pp. 81–114.
Walks, A., 2014b. Canada's housing bubble story: Mortgage securitization, the state, and the global financial crisis. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 38 (1), 256–284.
Walks, A., 2006. Homelessness, Housing Affordability and the New Poverty. In: Bunting, T.E., Filion, P. (Eds.), Canadian Cities in Transition: Local Through Global Perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 419–437.
Walks, A., 2001. The social ecology of the post-Fordist/global city? Economic restructuring and socio-spatial polarization in the Toronto urban region. Urban Stud. 38 (3), 407–447.
Walks, A., Bourne, L.S., 2006. Ghetto's in Canada's Cities? Racial segregation, ethnic enclaves and poverty concentration in Canadian urban areas. Canadian Geogr. 50(3), 273–297.
Walks, A., Clifford, B., 2015. The political economy of mortgage securitization and the neoliberalization of housing policy in Canada. Environ. Plan. A 47 (8), 1624–1642.
Walks, A., Maaranen, R., 2008a. The Timing, Patterning and Forms of Gentrification and Neighbourhood Upgrading in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver 1961 to 2001. University of Toronto, Toronto. Cities Centre Research Paper 211.
Walks, A., Maaranen, R., 2008b. Gentrification, social mix, and social polarization: testing the linkages in large Canadian cities. Urban Geogr. 29 (4), 293–326.
Wyly, E., Ponder, C.S., 2011. Gender, age, and race in subprime America. Housing Policy Debate 21 (4), 529–564.
Wyly, E., Newman, K., Schafran, A., Lee, E., 2010. Displacing New York. Environ. Plan. A 42, 2602–2623.
Wyly, E., Moos, M., Hammel, D., Kabahizi, E., 2009. Cartographies of race and class: mapping the class-monopoly rents of American subprime mortgage capital. Int. J. Urban Reg. Res. 33 (2), 332–354.
Wyly, E., Atia, M., Foxcroft, H., Hammel, D., Phillips-Watts, K., 2006. American home: predatory mortgage capital and neighbourhood spaces of race and class exploitation in the United States. Geografiska Annal. 88B (1), 105–132.