

The Local Politics of ‘Going Global’: Making and Unmaking Minneapolis–St Paul as a World City

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Summary. Minneapolis–St Paul is a good candidate for ‘world city’ status. The metropolitan area ranks 15th in the US in population; ranks 8th in total exports; hosts the headquarters of some of the largest transnational corporations in the world including 3M, General Mills, Target and Cargill; is home to the largest Somali and Hmong populations in the US; and has hosted major global spectacles such as the International Special Olympics and the Super Bowl. At the same time, Minneapolis–St Paul is far from embracing a world city identity. Although seen largely as beneficiaries of globalisation, residents of the Twin Cities routinely elect politicians to both the local and national levels who oppose free trade. Local efforts to make the metropolitan area into a world city, backed mainly by boosters in city and state government as well as large locally based corporations, have met with inconsistent political leadership, a lack of broad business support, and a strong democratic local politics which has limited the power of corporate interests both to direct the region’s economic development and to define the content of its international ties. In other similarly sized cities (such as Atlanta or Cleveland) corporate and political leaders have for the most part done as they pleased in building the city’s international character, but in Minneapolis–St Paul these actors have been largely defeated by populist politics. The case of the Minneapolis–St Paul world city project demonstrates the ability of a vibrant opposition both to moderate an élite drive to ‘go global’ and to define urban ‘success’ and ‘prestige’ in markedly non-global terms.

Introduction

Residents of the northern US State of Minnesota are not widely known for throwing elegant parties, eating caviar and rubbing elbows with the internationally rich and famous. Yet in 5 rooms on the 23rd floor of a prestigious Calgary hotel during the 1988 Winter Olympics, 3 of the highest elected officials in the state together with a coterie of corporate élites and \$350 000 in pocket money sought to ‘eat and schmooze’ their way into the US bid to host the 1996 Summer Olympic Games (Weiner, 1988b). Winning the right to host the Olympics—the

hallmark symbol of world city status (Short *et al.*, 1996; Short, 2003)—was to be the capstone on the globalisation project of Governor Rudy Perpich, who had come into office in 1983 during Minnesota’s most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression with a plan to solve the state’s woes through an embrace of the global economy. Shortly after the Calgary Games, these Minnesota globalisers treated members of the US Olympic Committee (USOC) to a tour of athletic facilities in the Minneapolis–St Paul metropolitan area and gave a final pitch to the USOC the following spring at the Washington, DC Hilton. The night before

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the presentation, the Minnesota bid group conducted a 'sports soirée' attended by the state's US congressional delegation and former Supreme Court Chief Justice (and St Paul native) Warren Burger. Newspaper CEOs, University of Minnesota athletics directors, Governor Perpich, Minneapolis Mayor Don Fraser and St Paul Mayor George Latimer all delivered speeches while a slide show told the stirring tale of the life of an anonymous female athlete on her journey from childhood to Olympic competition. They quoted the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter, played up government support for state-of-the-art Olympic facilities and concluded with the words

We're ready now to bring the Games back here [to the US] in '96. We can do it because we believe we can do it. We do believe (Weiner, 1988d)

punctuated by a dozen child-athletes singing, carrying an Olympic banner and wearing t-shirts emblazoned with the word 'Believe' (Weiner, 1988e)

While Atlanta was awarded the US bid (and ultimately the Olympic Games themselves), the 'Twin Cities' of Minneapolis and St Paul were hardly out of their league in chasing this global spectacle. Minneapolis had made it to the international level for the 1952 Games bid, tying for second with Los Angeles (Weiner, 1988c). In the competition for the 1996 bid, Minneapolis–St Paul beat out higher-profile cities such as San Francisco, Honolulu, Miami, San Diego and Washington (Grow, 1987). In many ways, in fact, the Twin Cities are a good candidate for 'world city' status. The metropolitan population is nearly 3 million, ranking it 15th among US metropolitan statistical areas (US Bureau of the Census, 2001); is 8th in total exports (US Office of Trade and Economic Analysis, 1999); hosts the headquarters of many Fortune Global 500 firms including 3M, General Mills and Target (as well as global grain-trader Cargill, the largest private firm in the world); is home to the largest Somali and Hmong populations in the US; and has hosted major global spectacles including the

Super Bowl and the International Special Olympics. Minneapolis is solidly within the top 50 'world cities' globally and top 15 nationally as measured by the location of the largest transnational corporate headquarters and branch offices (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004). Based on its wealth of business services firms (a much more focused definition of 'world city'), Beaverstock *et al.* (1999) classify Minneapolis as a 'gamma world city' ('alpha' being the top tier). Cities such as Amsterdam, Boston, Taipei and Washington rank alongside it and only four US cities—New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco—rank higher in world city characteristics.¹

Despite these objective evaluations from outsiders, Minneapolis–St Paul residents are highly ambivalent as to their region's 'world city' status. A quick comparison with Atlanta—the world's next great international city' according to a 1970s Chamber of Commerce promotion campaign—highlights Twin Citizens' attitudes. While local public support for Atlanta's Olympic bid was nearly unanimous, particularly in government and business circles, the Minneapolis City Council divided 8–4 (with strong opposition from the Council President) over whether to contribute a modest \$15 000 towards the initial bid process. While Georgia and Atlanta state officials were happy to use public funds and redevelop neighbourhoods in order to facilitate Olympic-related construction, one St Paul City Council member responded to plans for a new 90 000-seat open-air stadium in his city with the comment, "I've never heard of anything so stupid in my life" (quoted in Grow, 1987). Whereas Atlanta leaders have been obsessed with their city's status since its founding, always promoting, boosting and 'talking up their town' to anyone who will listen (Rutheiser, 1996), six government and business leaders in Minneapolis–St Paul felt compelled in 1999 to establish the Twin Cities International Roundtable (later expanded and renamed the 'Great North Alliance') out of a conviction that the region was operating "without a vision and strategy to compete in

the global economy". Structured "vision" interviews with 78 local business executives revealed that local CEOs think the Twin Cities have "no visibility in [the] national or global business community" as well as an "unfriendly business environment". The region suffers from a population "insular [and] complacent in beliefs and attitudes" (Twin Cities International Roundtable, 1999), with one frustrated globaliser going so far as to describe local residents as 'smug' in their provincialism (Wray, 1999)—hardly the attitude appropriate for an up-and-coming world city.

While quantitative indicators suggest that the Twin Cities is already a world city of some status, local support for a political agenda which would nurture Minneapolis and St Paul's global ties and position the region for global economic success—a 'world city project' (Paul, 2004)—is both tepid and inconsistent, while simultaneously facing a vocal and active opposition. This disjuncture between economic position and political practice highlights the importance of politics in making—or unmaking—the world city. Rather than simply reading interests off objective indicators, it is necessary instead to examine the local political struggles between those who oppose strategies to 'go global' and those who support them. Political debate in Minneapolis–St Paul has not revolved over whether the community is or is not 'international' or 'world class', so much as whether and to what degree the community *should be* so in the first place.

This article is an analysis of the general failure of the Minneapolis–St Paul world city project due both to broad disinterest in as well as pointed resistance to the vision offered by the project's proponents. Local 'growth machine' élites with visions of global grandeur have been unable to attract local small and medium capital, middle-class citizens groups or labour into a class alliance organised around the Twin Cities' 'international calling'. Instead, all these classes and class fractions have in one way or another refused to 'go global', in material as well as cultural terms. This article demonstrates

that building and attracting the trappings of world status are not foregone conclusions. It is instead a contentious political-economic project and the example of Minneapolis–St Paul suggests that an active citizenry can challenge and even usurp élite visions of globalisation.

The Local Politics of 'Going Global'

'Going global' has achieved the status of conventional wisdom in urban development strategy. In a world of both global turmoil and global opportunity, management guru Michael Porter (1995) urges local élites to create a global 'competitive advantage' while Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1995) presents three pathways towards 'world class' economic status. Public relations professionals advise cities on 'global branding' strategies (van Ham, 2002) and political élites around the world increasingly channel a 'cosmopolitan vision' into their leadership (Sklair, 2001). The quest for this holy grail has taken on such proportions that journalistic observers marvel at the widespread "mania for being a Truly International City" (Applebome, 2001). Urban leaders and image-shapers claim the label 'international', 'world-class', or 'global' as a fundamental characteristic of cities as diverse and unlikely as Mumbai (Shivdasani, 2001), Shenzhen (Cartier, 2002), Birmingham (James, n.d.), Houston (Brown, 2000) and even Charlotte, North Carolina (Charlotte, Mayor's International Cabinet, 1994). Development officials in Atlanta ('the next great international city'), Johannesburg ('an African world class city') and Helsinki ('an international city') even marshal it as a title. Few of these cities bear convincing objective markers of such status, but this has hardly stood in the way of elaborate local efforts to brand a city as 'global' or 'international'.

Unfortunately, the literature most engaged with researching world cities has been particularly lacking in its analyses of politics. John Friedmann (1986, 1995), Saskia Sassen (1991, 1994) and Peter Taylor (1997) have authored pioneering works

which now define the terrain upon which most studies of cities and the global political economy operate (GaWC, 2004). This literature, rooted in world systems theory, highlights the role of global processes in constituting local places and social formations as nodes in a global urban network. Yet world cities are not simply born of the froth of the global economy. They are made by social agents—particularly those within the state and at the urban scale—who stimulate and shape their growth.

It is no coincidence that urban élite interest in building ‘world cities’ has occurred at the same time as capital in the advanced industrialised countries has become increasingly transnational. Indeed, the local growth coalitions at the centre of much analysis of urban politics and state development policy have themselves ‘gone global’. The classic ‘growth machine’ account of urban politics (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987) emphasises the role played by a locally rooted capitalist class dependent on constantly rising land values and regional economic vitality for its income. Thus utilities, newspapers, land developers and construction firms are traditionally considered the key members of local growth machines. They occupy distinctly local ‘spaces of dependence’ (Cox, 1998) and thus, together with closely associated state actors (such as mayors, governors and secretaries of commerce), are the community leaders behind civic boosterism, land development schemes and urban growth in general.

While this local dependence continues for many important fractions of capital in contemporary world cities, the growth machine approach is ill-suited for an analysis of world city projects which seek to connect the local with the global in diverse ways. First, many constitutive members of local growth machines are becoming increasingly transnational. Secondly, locally headquartered or locally prominent transnational corporations are largely ignored in the growth machine approach but are central to the world city project. What may appear as ‘local’ capital in a study focused sharply on

the urban scale is often ‘transnational’ capital when our analytical lens is broadened to include the global political economy. The same is true even for local state officials who themselves are becoming increasingly tied to transnational capital both by ideology and direct functional and personal relations (Paul, 2002).

Two neo-Gramscian concepts, ‘accumulation strategy’ and ‘hegemonic project’, can be used to capture the agency of specific social actors as well as the effects of structure and the mutual constitution of the two through political struggle. Bob Jessop defines an ‘accumulation strategy’ as a general political-economic project rooted in the goal of continuous capital accumulation which serves to

define a specific economic growth model for a given economic space and its various extra-economic preconditions and ... outline a general strategy appropriate to its realization (Jessop, 1997, p. 61).

He offers Latin American import substitution industrialisation, West Germany’s *Modell Deutschland*, national *étatisme* in France and American military Keynesianism as historical examples (Jessop, 1983, pp. 94, 97). Today transnational liberalism (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) is the strategy of choice, within which fits export-oriented global competitiveness at the urban scale.

A ‘hegemonic project’, on the other hand, is a concrete program of action that asserts a contingent general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) (Jessop, 1997, p. 62).

In order to facilitate broad social support for an inherently unequal system, the hegemonic project stresses shared cultural and ideological values and beliefs. As Jessop (1983, p. 100) notes, hegemonic projects are “typically oriented to broader issues grounded not only in economic relations but also in the field of civil society and the state”. Building a ‘world city’ in which every local resident can revel and around which s/he can even build a political identity is the signature

project at the urban scale world-wide (Cox and Mair, 1988; Cox, 1999; Paul, 2004).

This is not to say, however, that capital has a free hand in shaping and defining the city. 'Going global' is a politically contested project and far from irresistible. Popular coalitions in Denver and Anchorage have actively impeded local élites' Olympic planning. The Canadian coalition 'Bread not Circuses' helped to scuttle Toronto's 2008 Olympic dreams. Peasant farmers near Mexico City protested and eventually blocked construction of a new international airport. Despite the rhetoric of universal values and collective benefits, subordinate populations know the reality is quite different. Some will enjoy the direct international air flights to global capitals while others will suffer increased noise pollution. Some will find employment with transnational corporations locating in the city while others will lose their jobs with small local firms. Some will profit from industrial incentives while others will pay higher taxes or suffer declining public services. Some will work in redeveloped technology parks while others will lose their homes to local 'improvements'. Some will welcome the cosmopolitan ethos of a world city while others will lament the erosion of local culture.

The urban scale has become increasingly significant in the (anti-) regulation of the global political economy. The social foundations of transnational liberalism must exist at the local scale just as much as at the national or the global. After all, many local governments exercise primary authority over land use and the built environment through laws on zoning and property ownership. They lead in the construction of transport and communications systems and exercise their own jurisdiction over financial services. They are primarily responsible for the education and training of labour, and, in North America especially, for regulating the capital-labour relationship through laws on minimum wages, unemployment and workers compensation insurance, and the legal rights of labour to organise. In both North America and increasingly in Europe,

local states are the main vehicles through which a diverse array of investment incentives such as tax credits and tax holidays, subsidised loans and loan guarantees, free land and infrastructure, free labour training, monetary grants, preferential government purchasing agreements and even investment capital are funnelled to corporations in an effort to manipulate the global circulation of capital.

As a result, cities and local states have become increasingly important sites of political struggle over not just urban growth but transnational liberalism itself. As leading national capitals have become increasingly transnational, and as national labour organisations have waned significantly in their political clout (particularly in the most neo-liberal countries), old national Fordist blocs have in turn eroded. New hegemonic and counter-hegemonic blocs in the Gramscian sense are emergent and the victory of capital is not a foregone conclusion. Transnational liberalism is far from commanding universal appeal even in the global North and local officials do not always follow the globalising path. Export promotion and world city projects co-exist with sustainable development efforts and 'buy local' campaigns, the latter often lodged in city and county governments as well as in the planning and environmental protection bureaucracies of states and provinces. Local state international activism has even at times turned distinctly against the transnational liberal model, seen most clearly in refusals to comply with international treaties regulating government procurement (Schroeder, 2004); selective purchasing laws targeted against Burma, Nigeria or China (Guay, 2000); city council resolutions against globalising economic treaties such as the Multilateral Agreement on Investments, the General Agreement on Trade in Services and 'investors rights' provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Dobbin, 2001; Heartfield, 2001); and city government boycotts of World Bank bonds (Whaley, 2001).

In short urban space and local states have become sites of political struggle over the future of the global economy. Today 'local politics' goes far beyond merely local issues

and local policies have implications far beyond the immediate locale. Likewise ‘global politics’ now touch local issues and constituencies, and political agents are increasingly knitting diverse scales together in complex ways in pursuit of their goals. As battlegrounds over the shape of 21st-century global capitalism, urban space and local states may in fact provide the most fertile ground for concrete political and economic opposition to transnational liberalism, particularly when animated by a trans-scalar politics advancing a radically different vision of what life under globalisation can be.

This article proceeds through discussions of three iconic manifestations of the Minneapolis–St Paul world city project over the past 20 years and demonstrates the ultimate success of small capital, middle-class citizens groups and labour both to limit the political-economic ambition of local globalisers and to define urban ‘success’ and ‘prestige’ in markedly non-global terms. The first covers the 4-year struggle to build the Minnesota World Trade Center as well as 15 ensuing years of political battle over financial and institutional support for the state’s international trade bureaucracy housed in it. The broad failure of the building and the public-private Minnesota World Trade Center Corporation to garner either material or political support from local capital illustrates the weak appeal which the rhetoric of globalisation can hold even for business. The second section reviews the on-going expansion of the Minneapolis–St Paul International Airport supported by local capital and local state élites, yet met and at times parried by the opposition of urban middle-class citizens groups through the tactics of basic political participation, quality of life arguments and democratic institutions. The third engages the metropolitan area’s ‘parochial’ culture and populist politics manifested in the Twin Cities’ failed bid in the late 1980s to host the XXVI Summer Olympiad and in recent corporate attempts, met with lacklustre results, to build local commitment to a global competitiveness strategy compatible with transnational liberalism.

A Global Imagineering D eb acle

The urban built environment is the canvas upon which a local world city project is sketched and painted. In decentralised (for example, federal) states especially, ‘city building’ in both the literal and the metaphorical sense defines the urban development agenda (Pagano and Bowman, 1995). Land use and capital investment as well as image creation and/or preservation—both increasingly integrated through the enactment of “symbolic and concrete imaginations” (Short and Kim, 1999, p. 101) in the cityscape—are the core elements in building physical manifestations of the city’s (desired) global qualities and infusing festivals, sporting events, buildings, parks, squares, roads, even whole neighbourhoods, with symbolic meaning. This constitutes the ‘imagineering’ (Rutheiser, 1996; Archer, 1997; Paul, 2004) of the world city, a political as well as economic project in which particular actors, classes and coalitions pursue their own visions of global status and connectivity.

Studies of urban imagineering tend to emphasise the external orientation of such place-based development strategies (see, for example, Archer, 1997; Short, 1999; Short *et al.*, 2000). Yet the very concept incorporates a critical inward dimension as well. When Archer (1997, p. 326)—for example, identifies Disney’s use of imagineering as “the construction, both physical and social, of a type of lived reality” inside its Orlando properties, he also highlights similar goals at the urban scale. A recent study on ‘branding’ in local and national economic development strategies observes how

location branding is not only (or perhaps even mainly) placing territory on customers’ mental map. It also plays an increasingly important internal function of identity-formation (van Ham, 2002, p. 254).

This practice of “managing identity, loyalty and image” (van Ham, 2002, p. 255) within the city is the most neglected yet the most significant political aspect of imagineering.

While certainly having economic purposes, those structures which constitute the cityscape (office towers, highways, airports, houses, parks) as well as the spectacles which celebrate urban life (cultural festivals, museums, sporting events) are not simply vehicles of capital accumulation. They narrate and advance a particular definition and interpretation of the city. Those behind such projects are able to wield political power through them by imposing their vision upon space (Zukin, 1997) and cultivating it in the minds and actions of urban residents, increasingly a vision of cosmopolitan values, global connectivity and wealth embodied in transnational capital.

Global imagineering in the Twin Cities is rather muted. Neither downtown has streets named after notable international figures (for example, Avenue du Président-Kennedy in Montreal or Avenida Dag Hammarskjöld in Santiago) nor any bearing particularly cosmopolitan names (for example, Avenue of the Americas in New York or International Boulevard in Atlanta). Despite a 1990s construction boom in downtown Minneapolis, no international district has emerged as in Birmingham (International Square) or Lyon (Cité Internationale). There are no globally themed public squares or parks, nor any demarcated and marketed immigrant neighbourhoods such as San Francisco's Chinatown or Los Angeles' Little Tokyo. The Twin Cities is host to the world famous Mall of America, but the symbolism of the structure, from its name to its red, white and blue star logo to its sprawling parking ramps with levels named after US states, all project a national rather than a global identity and role.

The region's signature project of global imagineering has instead been the Minnesota World Trade Center. Completed in 1987 as the brainchild of Governor Rudy Perpich and former US Congressman Richard Nolan, the 36-storey office tower was meant to pull the state out of recession by means of international trade. A world trade centre in the Twin Cities had first been discussed in the late 1970s and focused on the region's agricultural strengths, but when the idea was

revived by Nolan in 1983, Perpich quickly embraced it as a 'one-stop service centre' for local companies which would bring

buyers, sellers, transport and exhibition facilities, banks, trading companies and all other organisations interested in international trade together under one roof (Rudy Perpich; quoted in Wilson, 1983).

From the very beginning, very little about the project fulfilled this vision. St Paul was awarded the building despite the fact that the Twin Cities' international ties, characteristics and prestige are all clearly concentrated in Minneapolis. Early critics of the plan argued that constructing a large office and commercial complex in a downtown area would work directly against the stated goal of attracting small and medium businesses and organisations interested in international trade, since only the largest and most wealthy corporations, banks, law firms and the like could afford space in such a premier building. There was considerable scepticism that all the diverse interests outlined by Perpich, many competing directly against one another, would even care to locate together in one building (Foley, 1983; Petersen and Meryhew, 1986).

Undeterred, Perpich, St Paul Mayor George Latimer and their appointees shepherding the project were convinced otherwise, led less by economic argument than by the image they hoped the building would create. Richard Broeker, the first director of the public-private Minnesota World Trade Center Corporation, considered the large size and high quality of the building a psychological advantage in the international trading circuit (Petersen and Meryhew, 1986). Nolan referred to the building as a "monument to world trade", a "statement to the rest of the world", and "an invitation to the rest of the world to come here", maintaining all the while that the World Trade Center was "not just another office building" (Richard Nolan; quoted in Meryhew, 1987). Perpich himself went so far as to call the World Trade Center "the physical embodiment of my desire to project Minnesota into the mainstream

of international business and trade” (Rudy Perpich; quoted in Oslund, 1986) and, most significantly, “a symbol of Minnesota’s commitment to world trade” (Rudy Perpich; quoted in Oberdorfer, 1983).

The project’s global symbolism found its highest expression in plans, ultimately unrealised, to build an ‘International Mall of Nations’, a green space to run three blocks from the World Trade Center to an interstate highway cutting through the city, crossing it in a block-wide bridge deck, and then connecting to the state capital grounds on the other side. It was to be lined with the flags of the world, and tunnels and enclosed walkways were foreseen to run its entire length to provide convenient access during the harsh winter months (*Corporate Report Minnesota*, 1985).

Although spoken of as an expression of the Twin Cities’ commitment to ‘go global’ broadcast to an external audience, these Minneapolis–St Paul imagineers spent most of their time selling the commitment to their own residents. Government bureaucrats and legislators led the effort, while the local business community and the broader public completely failed to rally to the cause. Although supposedly the main beneficiaries of the centre, no more than a handful of firms engaged in international trade testified before the state legislature in its favour. Republicans of all people attempted to stop construction on several occasions, first by trying to scuttle a federal urban development loan and then seeking to prevent local construction unions from investing in the project. Republican State Auditor Arne Carlson was an early and prominent critic of the World Trade Center and other “high-visibility projects” which he felt promised to do little for the state economy (Carlson, 1986). As custodian of the state’s finances, Carlson encouraged the legislature to cut off all public funding to the World Trade Center Corporation, claiming that “the whole leadership there owes the public an apology” for wasting government funds (Arne Carlson; quoted in Oslund, 1987). Upon becoming Governor in 1991, Carlson promptly vetoed

a \$1 million legislative appropriation for the World Trade Center Corporation and tried mightily to privatise the organisation (McAuliffe, 1991). Local private support for the entire concept was so weak that the state could find no buyers and instead reorganised the corporation under new state direction.

Ironically, it was capital’s disinterest in the World Trade Center that did indeed make the building “a symbol of Minnesota’s commitment to world trade”, although not in the positive sense Perpich intended. Neither did Minneapolis–St Paul make much of a ‘statement to the world’ through the World Trade Center. The building’s international flavour never materialised and it failed completely to fulfil Perpich’s vision as a ‘one-stop shop’ for exporters. It has always been home to the downtown offices of banks and corporate law firms first and foremost, and neither the state’s major exporters nor any international trading companies ever located there. No large exhibition hall, hotel or World Trade Center club to facilitate networking with globe-trotting executives ever materialised. Apart from two short lines of flagpoles at the building’s main entrance, there was little to indicate that the structure had anything to do with international trade at all. The globalising discourse of state imagineers found so little resonance with local capital that by 2003 the Minnesota World Trade Center’s name was formally changed to ‘Wells Fargo Place’ after its primary occupant and, in 2004, the Minnesota Trade Office itself left the building, putting a final symbolic nail in the coffin of this star-crossed globalising misadventure.

ROARing against World City Infrastructure

A globalised transport infrastructure is perhaps the world city project’s most basic material foundation. The entire system of global production and consumption depends upon its ability to move goods, capital, labour, consumers and information quickly and efficiently. In the past, docks and water ports were the leading infrastructural projects linking a city to the global economy and,

while they remain important both economically and symbolically, today the international airport serves as a city's primary point of access as well as a privileged focus of world city projects.² As one scholar has noted,

For many cities attempting to compete in the global economy, the phrase 'direct flight to London' (or New York or Tokyo) has become a metaphor for success (Keeling, 1995, p. 118).

The Twin Cities' geographical location as well as its corporate history has long made it an air transport hub. As early as the 1920s, the future Minneapolis–St Paul International Airport (MSP) was an important stopping-point on Midwestern mail routes and the headquarters of leading air transport firms including Northwest Airways (today Northwest Airlines). Prior to US airline deregulation in the late 1970s, Minneapolis–St Paul was prevented from obtaining direct trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific routes, so direct flights to nearby Canadian cities or indirect trans-oceanic flights through Seattle, Anchorage or New York were the sum total of the area's international air transport profile. Direct links to Europe were established in 1979 but service fluctuated wildly, and not until 1989 did Minneapolis–St Paul gain a direct link to east Asia.

The Twin Cities have long been dependent upon Northwest Airlines to service the region's global transport networks. In 2002, 9 carriers not affiliated with Northwest flew international routes in and out of MSP, but the 7 least active carried a mere 0.07 per cent of the region's international passengers. Of the remaining 2, Air Canada flew strictly to Canadian cities and moved just 2.8 per cent of the airport's total international passenger traffic to non-tourist destinations.³ Icelandair, since 1998 the only airline apart from Northwest and its partner KLM to fly direct to Europe from MSP, carried only 3.6 per cent of all international passenger traffic to non-tourist destinations and serviced just 3.2 per cent of the airport's overall international market (US Department of Transport, n.d.).

Northwest's dominant position in the local market and the local world city project was sealed through its purchase of Republic Airlines in 1986, the Twin Cities' second-largest carrier at the time, as well as by the State of Minnesota's \$838 billion bailout of the airline in 1991, designed to save it both from the financial ruin brought on by a late 1980s leveraged buyout and from merger with other carriers. The success of Northwest had thus become, in the words of the Lieutenant Governor, "absolutely essential" for the region's economic development (quoted in Kennedy, 1996).

Unwilling to allow market forces alone to determine the airline's flight decisions, state and city officials turned into active lobbyists for expansion both to and for Northwest. After the carrier cancelled direct flights from MSP to Tokyo in 1992, re-establishing air links to east Asia became a government *cause célèbre*. When Northwest opened a non-stop service between Minneapolis–St Paul and Hong Kong in 1997, the Lieutenant Governor sat on the inaugural flight (Minnesota, Office of the Governor, 1997). The following year, Governor Carlson personally lobbied Chinese transport officials during a trade mission to Asia in an effort to lure flights by Northwest partner Air China to the Twin Cities. The mission itself was purposely delayed by two months so that Northwest could benefit from Carlson's "gubernatorial clout" (deFiebre, 1998). State officials have also sought to alleviate dependence upon Northwest, wooing tiny Icelandair to MSP in the late 1990s and sitting the Governor on the airline's first flight to Reykjavik (Whereatt, 1998).

Twin Cities globalisers have less control over flights than they do over facilities and it is precisely the expansion of the airport's physical infrastructure which has sparked political struggle over not only the airport but over the nature and character of the region itself. In 1996, a new \$41 million international arrivals facility connected to the main terminal was opened and one of the runways was extended to more than 3300 metres expressly to handle the larger heavier jets

which accompany international travel (Kennedy, 1996). In 1998, the same runway was again extended to over 3600 metres to ensure, in the words of one Metropolitan Airports Commission official, that the Twin Cities have “a strong, international airport” (quoted in Associated Press, 1998). The same year a major \$3.1 billion expansion project was approved to fund new gates, a new fourth runway, new parking and a remodelled main terminal. This physical expansion has been met with impressive growth in the airport’s international demand. During 1996–2001, total international passenger traffic through MSP grew an impressive 44 per cent and regularly scheduled international traffic rose 48 per cent, while national figures were only 15 per cent and 17 per cent respectively (US Department of Transport, n.d.). Since 9/11, international passenger growth through MSP has been more in line with national trends. However, the scheduled completion of the fourth runway in late 2005 should generate another remarkable growth spurt in traffic.

While the economic benefits of this expansion are spread throughout the Twin Cities, its costs are largely concentrated in the residential areas of south Minneapolis and the suburb of Richfield abutting the airport. Since 1992, over 7600 homes have required sound insulation under government regulations (Metropolitan Airports Commission, 2004) with plans for nearly 4000 more (Wascoe, 2004). In Richfield, over 800 housing units and 2 entire neighbourhoods have disappeared over the past decade, all claimed by airport expansion. Combined with a continuing trend of population contraction at odds with population stabilisation among the rest of Minneapolis’ first-tier suburban cities, Richfield has been tagged “the Twin Cities’ incredible shrinking suburb” (Wascoe, 1998).

Political reaction to these trends has precipitated into citizen-led noise abatement groups, whose increasing rancour has paralleled the airport’s expanding size and service. In turn, the relationship between these groups and the airlines—primarily

Northwest—has deteriorated markedly. In the late 1960s, long before the US federal government became officially interested in noise abatement, the Metropolitan Aircraft Sound Abatement Council was created as a joint industry–citizen forum for discussion and co-operation on reducing jet noise in areas near the airport. In late 2000, the airlines, led by Northwest, quit the council under complaints that it had become too much of a “community advocacy group” (quoted in Wascoe, 2001a) and the organisation subsequently collapsed. Both activists and state legislators representing home-owners near the airport nevertheless continued to push for increased spending on noise insulation for local houses and limitations on night-time flights. As evidence of their political clout, R. T. Rybak, a founding member of the most aggressive local anti-airport noise citizens group ROAR (Residents Opposed to Airport Racket), ran for mayor of Minneapolis in 2001 in his first-ever attempt at public office. Rybak first defeated the sitting two-term mayor, herself closely associated with downtown business interests, in a city-wide party political convention and then trounced her two-to-one in the general election.

Since becoming mayor, Rybak has been influential in resisting the latest push by local business interests to expand cargo facilities at MSP. Currently, some 80 per cent of international cargo bound to or from the Twin Cities flies through other cities and is then trucked to Minnesota. In response, local business leaders have sounded alarms over the competitive implications of the airport ranking 14th in the world in passenger traffic but only 45th in moving freight (SITA Logistics Solutions, 2001; *Star Tribune*, 2001). In opposing any relaxation in current limitations on night-time flights, Rybak has endorsed a consulting group’s recommendation that the Metropolitan Airports Commission remove cargo handling altogether from MSP and relocate it to an alternative airport hub within the state (Wascoe, 2001b; Duchscher, 2003). He has also continued to battle with the airport commission over sound abatement throughout his tenure (Rybak *et al.*, 2004).

In vigorously opposing breakneck expansion and a narrow economic calculus, Twin Cities airport opponents have instead forced a slow growth strategy tied to broader quality of life arguments. Rybak in particular embodies the willingness and ability of local residents to offer a definition of urban success dramatically different from that of business. International airports, sports stadiums and downtown skyscrapers—all projects pursued by the former mayor—are not signs of greatness in his opinion. In fact, they are quite the opposite. “I was born in a great city”, Rybak has said, “and I’m not going to die in a mediocre place”. (R. T. Rybak; quoted in Olson, 2001).

Local limitations imposed on MSP have at least indirectly spurred the growth of a rival. Detroit has long been a base of operations for Northwest Airlines, but in the 1990s both that city’s international airport and its relationship with the airline grew dramatically. While leaders and citizens in the Twin Cities debated and ultimately rejected the construction of a new airport at the edge of the metropolitan area, Detroit planned and funded a new terminal designed and constructed by Northwest itself with millions of dollars of generous financial support from Wayne County and the State of Michigan bolstered by several important anti-competitive clauses in the project agreement (Vyas, 2004). Detroit in turn has become Northwest’s ‘world gateway’, even first funnelling eastwards many Minnesota travellers ultimately bound westward for Asia.

While former Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson has “been concerned about Detroit” ever since he left office in January 1999 (A. Carlson; quoted in Torbenson, 2001), most residents of the Twin Cities have shown little distress and demonstrated less desire to compete head-to-head for this international business. Passenger data suggest that Minnesotans have been right not to worry, for Detroit’s new status and terminal, opened in early 2002, have not propelled it further ahead of the Twin Cities. US air traffic figures have been universally depressed since 11 September 2001, but much less so at

MSP than in Detroit (DTW). From the first half of 2001 to the first half of 2004, total passenger traffic on scheduled international flights changed –7.5 per cent in DTW but only –3.8 per cent in MSP. Even more remarkable were the uneven declines in Northwest’s international passenger traffic, –10.1 per cent through Detroit while just –3.0 per cent through Minneapolis–St Paul (US Department of Transport, n.d.). The siren call of airport ‘competitiveness’ in the Twin Cities has had little economic evidence or cultural resonance to support it.

Wayward Spectacles

Global spectacles are the most socially far-reaching, ideologically charged and politically manipulable manifestations of a world city project. International sporting events and cultural festivals sited in a particular locale yet consumed by the entire world animate a globalised local space, proclaiming both that the globe should be embraced and that the city can only be truly validated when embraced (or consumed) in return. The unrivalled pinnacle of global spectacle is the Summer Olympic Games, its sheer size promising unmatched media coverage for the host city as well as unmatched projections of local economic windfall. Even though such returns often fail to materialise, global spectacle does far more than contribute to local capital accumulation. It serves as a door through which a city enters the world stage, simultaneously creating and confirming its global status and prestige. Global spectacle has the ability to mould local self-identification into not simply a dynamic but a ‘worldly’ community which desires deepening connections with the globe for both economic and cultural reasons (Harvey, 1989).

In the late 1980s, Minneapolis–St Paul strove to reach this pinnacle. Twin Cities globalisers were convinced that they could bring the Olympics to the region⁴ and that the Games would transform the Twin Cities irrevocably for the better. The Governor claimed

This will put us on the map internationally. I can't think of anything that would do more for the state than the Olympics (R. Perpich; quotes in Weiner, 1988a).

The editor of the region's largest newspaper (and head of the local Olympic organising committee) summed up the cultural dimension of the bid in saying

To me, the big reason to bid for the Olympics—and it's one you can't quantify—is it would be an anointment of the Twin Cities (R. Parkinson; quoted in Weiner, 1988a).

Polls suggested that many local residents agreed, at least in a nebulous sense. Just prior to the US Olympic Committee's site selection, 79 per cent of residents supported the idea of a Twin Cities Olympics while only 4 per cent opposed it and people flocked to petitions placed in both downtowns urging the USOC to choose Minneapolis–St Paul. While most residents indicated they supported the Olympics for its financial promise, 29 per cent cited the increased prestige for the region as a main reason for their support (Klauda, 1988). At the time, the Twin Cities were having success in attracting the highest-profile sporting events and the Olympics seemed to many the natural culmination of a progression which included the 1987 World Series and awards of the 1990 US Olympic Sports Festival, the 1991 International Special Olympics and the 1992 Super Bowl and NCAA Final Four basketball tournament.

While the highest public officials and corporate boosters enthusiastically chased the Olympic dream, some prominent voices were less sanguine. The Minneapolis city council divided 8–4, with the council president among the dissenters, on whether to spend the relatively minor sum of \$15 000 on the initial bid. State Auditor Arne Carlson, always monitoring the bottom line, argued

We want the Olympics, but like everything else, we have to ask: At what price and who pays? (A. Carlson; quoted in *Minneapolis Star and Tribune*, 1987).

Popular local newspaper columnist Jim Klobuchar regularly agitated against the bid. While the editorial page of the Twin Cities' leading paper admitted that "hosting an event on the scale of the Olympics isn't for everyone" while nonetheless proclaiming "it would be folly to reject the idea prematurely" (*Star Tribune*, 1987), Klobuchar was brazen enough to confront the imagineers on the terrain of fundamental social and cultural values.

Growth is nice and so are spectacles. But sometimes you can have the good and better life by recognising that continuing turmoil and hot-breathed hustling aren't always the most conducive climates for societal health. Minnesota has been on the verge of making some goofy decisions in the past few years on the side of spectacle and in a galloping pursuit of jobs at all costs, the cost in some cases being common sense and debt. Acquiring the Olympic Games doesn't necessarily make this a better place (Klobuchar, 1987).

State and corporate élites were enamoured of the spiritual values of the Games, but the region's lack of cosmopolitan virtues and values ultimately thwarted the Twin Cities' bid. Global imagineers from rival Atlanta played up their city's cosmopolitan and multi-cultural flavour based on its airport, its bi-racial character and its self-portrayal as the 'human rights capital of the world' (Rutheiser, 1996). Those in Minneapolis–St Paul instead used a "more deliberate, low-key approach" (Weiner, 1988d), pledging fidelity to the values of amateur sports rather than promising a cosmopolitan festival. Olympic organising committee head Roger Parkinson summed up the local cultural commitments in saying that his group and the sub-national state leadership were "not trying to do it with splash; we're trying to do it with substance *and be Minnesotan*" (R. Parkinson; quoted in Benidt, 1988; emphasis added). While this may have been an appropriate pitch to a 1970s US Olympic Committee interested in holding back the commercialisation of the Games, after the financial success

of the corporate-run 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, 'being Minnesotan' was hardly what the USOC was after.

This sense of soberness is itself a challenge to any effort to produce global spectacle in the Twin Cities. Like all contemporary 'post-industrial' cities, Minneapolis and St Paul have many popular urban festivals. The problem from the perspective of world city builders is that none is terribly cosmopolitan. Festivals produced by local immigrant communities do exist, the most notable being the annual Minnesota Hmong Sports Tournament which attracts tens of thousands of people to St Paul every summer in the largest Hmong celebration in the US. Few outside the Hmong community, however, attend. Probably the most international of the Twin Cities festivals are the Schwan's USA Cup youth soccer tournament and an annual 'Festival of Nations' in St Paul devoted primarily to eating ethnic foods and selling traditional crafts. The largest of the Twin Cities' urban spectacles are the Minnesota State Fair in St Paul (the nation's second-largest), the St Paul Winter Carnival and the Minneapolis Aquatennial (famed for its milk carton boat races)—all having a distinctly local tone and appeal.

In the late 1990s, Minneapolis officials sought to remedy this local cultural 'shortcoming'. In November 1999, the Minneapolis City Council approved the creation of an Office of Cultural Affairs, a long-standing project of Mayor Sharon Sayles Belton and downtown business élites. The mission of this body, according to the mayor, was to bring

an international festival, or festivals, to our community... It just makes sense that we would try to create an international event in this culturally rich environment (S. S. Belton; quoted in Diaz, 1999a).

According to the President and CEO of the Minneapolis Downtown Council

The only thing we're missing in our pantheon of cultural blessings is a chance

to invite the world to our downtown business district (quoted in Diaz, 1999b).

The Office immediately devoted itself to creating just such an international arts festival, with the goal of hosting one within two years. A little over two years later, the only new accomplishment the Office could point to was its own dissolution orchestrated by Mayor Rybak in early 2002.

With Twin Cities' residents routinely failing to rally behind the cosmopolitan banner, globalising interests have turned to a campaign of threats and insults in the hope of fostering what one major state and local government policy magazine dubbed the 'Minnesota malaise' (Gurwitt, 2002). Near the peak of the late-1990s economic boom, a small group of prominent corporate and government executives began publicly to question the future economic health of the Twin Cities. In a letter sent to local corporate executives in 1998 based on the conviction that "the Twin Cities region needs to act", this group worried that "the Twin Cities region may become a victim, rather than a player, in the new world economy" and sought opinions on, among other things, "the present competitiveness and position of the Twin Cities compared with other business centers of the world economy" so as to create "a vision and strategy to compete". From the 78 executives responding to the letter, an overall evaluation of the local economy emerged which emphasised the area's cultural as much as its economic or organisational weaknesses. A Powerpoint presentation on the "Leadership Vision Quest" report released in 1999 highlighted the Twin Cities' "unfriendly business environment", being "insular [and] complacent in beliefs in attitudes", its "inward thinking", and its satisfaction with "good enough" while abjuring "excellence" (Twin Cities International Roundtable, 1999). In 2000, the leading local newspaper joined the act, running a six-day editorial series which opened with the headline "smug too long". The cultural shortcomings of the locals were summed up as "Minnesota's deepest character flaw: contentment". A "culture of good

enough” supposedly reigned in which insular Minnesotans, exhibiting their “pietist culture”, think their region is “pretty good, and that’s good enough”. For Twin Cities globalisers, of course, this attitude is an “apathetic” one of people “choosing retreat” and flying the flag of “economic surrender” (Berg and Hage, 2000).

The organisation ‘Great North Alliance’ emerged out of these discussions within the Twin Cities corporate sector and is led by a board of prominent Minneapolis–St Paul-based national and transnational corporations such as 3M, Wells Fargo, Cargill, Qwest, Medtronic and the Mall of America, and supported financially by the Greater Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, the Minnesota High Tech Association and the Twin Cities Airport Task Force among others (Great North Alliance, 2001). Benchmarking, a key globalising practice of transnational capital (Sklair, 2001), has become its primary ideological weapon. Focusing on measures of ‘global competitiveness’ in a provocatively named annual “Opportunity Forecast”, the Great North Alliance uses ‘over 100 objective indicators’ stressing features such as labour force productivity, number of Fortune 500 corporations and large non-profits, jobs and investment in high-skill and high-technology sectors, research and development expenditures, business infrastructure and entrepreneurial dynamism. In 2000, the group gave the Twin Cities a grade of C-, tied for the lowest among 7 US metropolitan areas (Great North Alliance, 2000). In 2001, it raised the Twin Cities mark to C, tying for next-to-last among 11 cities (Great North Alliance, 2001).

Compare this benchmarking exercise with a decade-old one put out by the state Department of Administration (previously the state agency Minnesota Planning). Entitled *Minnesota Milestones*, this alternative report incorporates far more than simply economic indicators to draw a picture of the state’s current conditions and its future directions. Several of the indicators are based upon citizen, not corporate, evaluations (of child care, public safety and government services),

as well as broad measures of public health, the social environment for children, crime, community involvement, energy use, pollution and the presence of open space. Even its economic measures are distinct, including energy efficiency, job placement for two-year college graduates, regional disparities in unemployment rates and traffic congestion. Rather than dwell on competitiveness and condemn the cultural complacency of “the culture of good enough”, *Minnesota Milestones* unabashedly declares

We Minnesotans like our state . . . We do not want growth and change to overpower our quality of life (Minnesota Planning, 2002).

A discourse depicting globalisers as dynamic cosmopolitan risk-takers and their opponents as sluggish parochial do-nothings is a familiar cultural trope. In Minneapolis–St Paul, its use is also evidence of an increasingly desperate corporate elite showing “signs of unease . . . everywhere” (Gurwitt, 2002). In the face of local middle and working classes which almost wholly fail to share their discomfort, they are openly frustrated as to “why no one is aroused over this” (quoted in Berg and Hage, 2000). Statistics suggest that the Twin Cities region is prospering, with per capita income, population, employment and education levels all growing faster than the national average since the early 1970s. However, globalisers repeatedly chime that the future does not belong to Minneapolis–St Paul. Even as Great North Alliance (2003) raised the region’s grade to B in 2002/03, its CEO continued to insist that

the Twin Cities picture is darker than the average metro and darker than that of the nation as a whole (Petty, 2004).

Organised labour has openly criticised the group’s practices as little more than an attempt to pressure the state government for business subsidies (Bakst, 2000) and independent observers agree that the Great North Alliance has failed to lead a charge towards embracing a global competitiveness strategy.

After five years of activity, the organisation still had “yet to get its message out to a broad audience” and its public profile remains “low” (FutureWorks, 2004).

Conclusion

The costs of global neo-liberalism are becoming increasingly clear. Mass organisation against its manifestations, from Seattle to Genoa to Porto Alegre, have forced a wide public debate over ‘free trade’ and globalisation into the public forum which has the potential to shape popular common sense against the transnational liberal project (Rupert, 2000). Its local manifestations in the form of world city projects have generated similar political struggles. In an effort to sell local residents on the sacrifices of going global—including increased taxation, aircraft noise, inconvenience or simply the transformation of a local identity from familiar, particular and even provincial to unfamiliar, universal and cosmopolitan—globalising élites make purposive appeals to a remade place-based identity and the value of projecting that identity globally. Simply getting ‘on the map’ is offered as a worthwhile goal in and of itself. In the words of Kevin Cox

What the growth coalition seems to be articulating in these cases is a conception of place that plays on a valorisation of the modern, of being progressive, or more accurately a particular interpretation of what it means to be modern and progressive. This assumes diverse forms depending on context. In larger cities it is a matter of becoming ‘major league’, ‘achieving national visibility’, or becoming ‘the gateway to the Pacific Rim’. In smaller towns it is the symbols of ‘progress’ that become important and which are foregrounded in local booster discourse: perhaps the ritual opening of a shopping mall by some outside dignitary, thereby symbolising recognition by the larger outside world, as if, that is, the mall was not sufficiently symbolic in itself. The alternatives to these versions of ‘progress’

are given a clear negative value: ‘cowtown’, ‘hicksville’, ‘the boonies’, etc. (Cox, 1999, pp. 31–32).

The “mania for being a Truly International City” (Applebome, 2001), however, has been attenuated in Minneapolis–St Paul, where ‘pretty good’ does indeed seem to be good enough. The existence of the (former) Minnesota World Trade Center and groups such as the Great North Alliance demonstrates that the mania exists even here, but that transnational capital and globalising boosters do not have free reign. Small and medium-sized businesses have a continued presence in the local economy and a continuing political independence from transnational capital. Likewise, the urban public in Minneapolis–St Paul has proved difficult to rouse in support of the world city project. While state executives tend to support the world city project, other elements of the state are not reticent to oppose them, not to mention citizens groups and labour organisations.

With a strong democratic civic tradition and well-organised middle and working classes, a neo-liberal agenda has little chance of success in Minnesota. Capital and particularly state élites have instead sought to build a broad class alliance around what Leo Panitch calls

a ‘progressive competitiveness’ strategy ... whereby labour and the state are urged to take the initiative and seize the hand of business in making the running towards competitive success (Panitch, 1994, p. 82).

Jamie Gough sees a ‘left social-democratic strategy’ as a not unusual local state policy characteristic of cities with politically important working and middle classes (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1996; Gough, 2002, 2004). While capital seeks to dominate the pool of cheap labour and raw materials through the law of value, it uses social democracy to woo valuable labour pools and material infrastructures with a hegemonic project. According to Gough (2004), local social democracy is even functional for capital in that it helps to depoliticise the state and its economic development initiatives.

Consensus and depoliticisation hardly describe the Minneapolis–St Paul world city project. How are we to understand the politics of opposition, obstruction and indifference in Minnesota to transnational liberalism, not simply from labour and the urban middle class but from sectors of capital as well? Among those seeking to spread the ‘Minnesota malaise’, the region’s ‘populist politics’ come in for special blame for the Twin Cities’ fall from grace. Populism constitutes

our greatest barrier to competitive revival because it considers élitist, frivolous and corrupt the very quality-of-life investments we must make if Minnesota hopes to retain and attract the talented wealth-producers of the new economy (Berg, 2000).

Indeed, it is popular democratic politics that make the Twin Cities unique and have kept the local world city project at bay for some 20 years. Minnesota is the only state in the US whose major left party is not the Democratic Party but the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, born of a 1944 merger between the state’s Democrats and its insurgent populist Farmer-Labor Party. Voter turnout in Minnesota is routinely 15–20 percentage points higher than the national average and since 1998 consistently the highest in the country. In 1998, the state’s voters elected former professional wrestler Jesse Ventura as Governor in a wave of populist disaffection with the established parties and candidates and, in 2001, Minneapolis elected not only an anti-noise activist as mayor but also two Green Party candidates to its city council.

Unlike social democracy, populism does not generate co-operation with transnational capital and support for a globalised competitiveness strategy. It instead seeks local democratic control of the state while privileging social interaction and co-ordination through civil society and even the market. It also uses a relatively inward-looking culture to limit external economic influences. The case of Minneapolis–St Paul indicates that it is a mistake to read politics from economic indicators. The Twin Cities are rather advanced on many common measures of world city

capacity, but their enthusiasm for going global is distinctly reserved. Competition has not forced the harmonisation of Minnesota’s industrial incentives policy with that of FDI ‘winners’ (LeRoy, 1999) and neither has it forced a competitiveness strategy and world city project upon urban residents unimpressed with the trappings of cosmopolitanism. Even a Republican governor can praise “a special Minnesota spirit, and that’s the reason we love our state” more or less as it is (Associated Press, 2004) as well as take the dramatic step of intentionally undermining free trade by revoking state compliance with trade agreement rules banning preferential treatment for local firms and restrictions on outsourcing for government procurement (Schroeder, 2004). The case of Minneapolis–St Paul indicates that real local autonomy can exist in the shadows of transnational liberalism.

Notes

1. In their summary (Table 7), Beaverstock *et al.* mistakenly give Minneapolis a score of 4 (in the same category with Atlanta, Miami and Shanghai) when a closer tally reveals the city’s true score is 6. Scores of 4, 5 and 6 are all in the ‘gamma world city’ category.
2. Robert Reich (1991, p. 239) argues any world city seeking to stimulate the local production of “global symbolic analysis” needs a world-class university and an international airport.
3. By “non-tourist”, I mean to exclude flights to Caribbean and Mexican tourist destinations such as Montego Bay, Cancun and Matzatlán. Such flights are poor markers of world city status and completely lack the prestige associated with direct flights to world cities such as London.
4. Minneapolis had previously bid for the Summer Olympics four times (1948, 1952, 1956, 1960) and the Winter Olympics once (1932).

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