The White Right: A Gendered Look at the Links Between "Victim" Ideology and Anti-Black Lives Matter Sentiments in the Era of Trump

Deena A Isom [iD]
University of South Carolina, USA

Hunter M Boehme
North Carolina Central University, USA

Deanna Cann
University of South Carolina, USA

Amber Wilson
University of South Carolina, USA

Abstract

Employing a racialized gendered lens, we explore the perceptions of status threat and victimhood among a sample of White Americans following the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, we draw upon such theoretical and empirical work to frame our analyses of the associations between perceptions of a white "victim" ideology and anti-Black Lives Matter (BLM) sentiments and how such associations may be conditioned by support for Trump and holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs. We propose that the BLM movement may be perceived as a "threat" to many White Americans. Furthermore, we believe Whites' anti-BLM sentiments will be enhanced by support for Trump, given his racist, misogynistic, xenophobic, and oppressive tendencies. Moreover, we believe that these associations will differ based on gender and beliefs in patriarchal gender norms, as White men and women are likely to feel status threat in varied ways. Mix support for our propositions and complex gendered differences are revealed. Implications are discussed.

Corresponding author:
Deena A Isom, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice and African American Studies Program, University of South Carolina, 1305 Greene Street, Columbia, South Carolina, 29208, USA.
Email: isom@mailbox.sc.edu

> *No one can tell me that if it had been a group of Black Lives Matter protesters yesterday that they wouldn't have been treated differently than the mob that stormed the Capitol. We all know that's true – and it's unacceptable.*
>
> *~ Joe Biden, then President-elect, on Twitter, 7 January 2021*
>
> *We have witnessed two systems of justice: one that let extremists storm the U.S. Capitol yesterday, and another that released tear gas on peaceful protestors last summer. It's simply unacceptable.*
>
> *~ Kamala Harris, then Vice President-elect, on Twitter, 7 January 2021*

Introduction

On 6 January 2021, thousands of Donald Trump supporters, most of whom were White and many of whom were men, breached the United States Capitol building in the midst of the certification of the presidential electoral college vote in favor of Joe Biden (Hauck and Barfield Barry, 2021; Hymes et al., 2021; Stein et al., 2021). Despite forewarning, security and police presence were sparse, particularly in comparison to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests in response to police brutality over the summer (Booker, 2021). Beyond gaining access to the Capitol building, the insurrectionists were not maintained for over 3 hours, leading to chaos, fear, destruction, and death (Leatherby et al., 2021). Many participants live-streamed their participation on social media and justified their actions as an invitation from Donald Trump (Helderman et al., 2021), flouting their perceived entitlement and lack of fear of reprisal. To date, nearly 400 people have been charged in relation to the Capitol siege (U.S. Department of Justice, nd), largely due to their social media posts.

This study was already underway prior to the events of 6 January 2021. However, those events are likely manifestations of the intricate associations presently assessed. Media from that day (and prior) provide insight into how many of those involved, particularly White men, felt—anger at their perceived "victimization" by "progressives" (Heilweil and Ghaffary, 2021; Wallace-Wells, 2021; Wells et al., 2021). Scholars have long theorized that socially dominant groups, in the face of increasing power of subordinate others, perceive threat to their dominant status and will enact various forms of control or engage in certain behaviors to maintain their power and privilege (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Olzak, 1992). These feelings are widespread within the realm of the far-right conservative movements (Berbrier, 2000; Boehme and Isom Scott, 2020; Kimmel, 2017), which are commonly characterized by "1) a strong sense of white identity, 2) a belief in the importance of white solidarity, and 3) a sense of white victimization" (Hawley, 2018b, para 5).

In addition to racial hierarchies, white nationalism and similar extremist beliefs are grounded in patriarchal gender norms (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Ferber, 1998; Ferber and Kimmel, 2004; Kelly, 2017; Kimmel, 2017; Lyons, 2017). As such, a societal and cultural emphasis on diversity and equality adds an additional aspect of alarm for these groups as it threatens orthodox patriarchal systems. Notions of status hierarchies regarding gender and race work together to influence one's perceptions

and behaviors (Collins, 2019; Isom Scott, 2018). Therefore, gender identity in addition to beliefs in patriarchal gender norms are likely to play an important role in White individuals' experiences with status threat and sense of victimhood due to perceived increasing social equality.

Employing a racialized gendered lens, we explore the perceptions of status threat and victimhood among a sample of White Americans following the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, we draw upon such theoretical and empirical work to frame our analyses of the associations between perceptions of a white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments and how such associations may be conditioned by support for Trump and holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs. In a time when political ideology falls greatly along gendered and racial lines (Pew Research Center, 2018), we hypothesize that the BLM movement may be perceived as a "threat" to many White Americans. Furthermore, we believe Whites' perceptions of "victimhood" will not only be associated with anti-BLM sentiments, but will likely be enhanced by support for Trump, given his racist, misogynistic, xenophobic, and oppressive tendencies (Barkun, 2017; Barnett, 2018; McManus et al., 2019; Rothe and Collins, 2019). Moreover, we believe that these associations will differ based on gender and beliefs in patriarchal gender norms, as White men and women are likely to feel status threat in varied ways (e.g. Collins, 2000; Dow, 2016; Kimmel, 2017). Below we briefly review our theoretical and empirical underpinnings and historically situate the current racial and political tensions to ground our analyses.

Perceived Status Threat and Victim Ideology

Scholars have long argued that perceived threats to status, power, and privilege by those in the dominant position (i.e. Whites)—whether politically, economically, or sheer numbers—lead to feelings of threatened identity and self-worth (e.g. Bobo, 1983; Hewstone et al., 2002; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and backlash toward marginalized others in the form of increased social control (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Bobo, 1999; Olzak, 1992), greater political polarization (e.g. Craig and Richenson, 2014; Jardina, 2019; Klein, 2020), increased hostility (Umphress et al., 2007), and even potentially sparking violence and crime (Isom Scott and Andersen, 2020; Isom Scott and Grosholz, 2019). Since racial equality is often perceived to be a zero-sum game, as people of Color or other oppressed populations gain degrees of equality, some Whites perceive this as a loss to their own status (Isom Scott, 2018; Outten et al., 2012). For example, in recent years, as the United States has become more equal than ever before with the election of the first Black president, increasing prominent social figures of Color, and unprecedented rates of people of Color attaining higher education and prestigious jobs (Anderson, 2016; Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1998), many Whites believed that they had lost the presidency, cultural icons, college admission opportunities, and careers (Hammon, 2013). While these advances are noteworthy, our society is far from equal, as Whites—and particularly men—still hold most positions of power and influence (Zweigenhaft, 2020). Thus, in reaction to perceived increasing equality, some Whites believe that their social status is not only threatened, but already lost, and that *they* are now the victims of a racially biased society (Kimmel, 2017).

This sentiment seems to be especially prevalent among Whites who subscribe to far-right conservative ideologies. Berbrier (2000), for example, finds this sense of victimhood to be rampant among white supremacists, and others have identified this ideology among those in the Alt-Right (e.g. Boehme and Isom Scott, 2020; Hammon, 2013; Isom et al., 2021). Berbrier (2000) posits five themes of white victimhood: "(1) that Whites are victims of discrimination, (2) that their rights are being abrogated, (3) that they are stigmatized if they express "pride," (4)

that they are being psychologically affected through the loss of self-esteem, and (5) that the end product of all of this is the elimination of "the white race" (p. 176). Notably, these victimhood sentiments are not limited to extremist groups but appear to be increasingly shared among moderate Whites who feel they have become politically and economically displaced (e.g. Kaufmann, 2019; Kimmel, 2017).

The Mainstreaming of Far-Right Ideology

Recently, the United States has seen a rise in far-right extremist groups, such as the Alt-Right, Boogaloo Bois, Oath Keepers, and Proud Boys—all of whom were active participants in the Capitol Riots (Thompson and Fischer, 2021)—with their particular beliefs resonating with many White Americans (Gramlich, 2016). These far-right groups are heterogeneous and evolve for many reasons that include inter-group conflict, anger of feeling left behind by the government, and support for anti-progressive movements (e.g. LBGTQ+ rights, pro-choice movements, gun control legislation), among others (Bliuc et al., 2019; Isom et al., 2021; Wuthnow, 2018). A recent Pew Research Center poll showed that certain extreme sentiments (surrounding race and gender) are becoming commonplace by Republican respondents, and thus normalized in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2020). Even historically democratic "rust belt" states flipped to Republican in the 2016 election, largely due to the influence of right-wing sentiments such as rejecting multiculturalism and embracing xenophobia, homophobia, and white supremacy (Clark, 2017; McQuarrie, 2017). Researchers find these groups consist largely of White, older, middle-class, married, Christian men with little education residing predominantly in the Midwest (Forscher and Kteily, 2020; Hawley, 2017, 2018a, 2018b). The large lack of diversity on the right (Klein, 2020) has fueled the normalization of far-right sentiments and rise of increasingly dangerous white nationalist groups (e.g. Papenfuss, 2019), largely in response to felt threats to the status quo (Kaufmann, 2019; Kimmel, 2017).

Scholars have suggested the racist and sexist nature of such movements can be partially attributed to support for pseudoscientific based "evidence" justifying gender and racial inferiority/superiority (Kaldis, 2013; Neiwert, 2017). Kimmel (2017) proposes that class, like gender and race, also contributes to these sentiments. Because social class in today's America is more racially and gender equal than ever before, whereby the middle class is becoming more gender and racially diverse, the growing chasm between rich and poor is a strong driver of far-right ideology (Kimmel, 2017). While the primary focus of this paper is on the intersectional effects of race and gender, it does not go without recognizing the socioeconomic platform white supremacist movements have displayed (Bonilla-Silva, 2001). Specifically, the shift in the American economy has left many Americans—particularly rural, undereducated, working-class people, many of whom are White— unable to make a living wage or provide a comfortable life for their families (Chen, 2015; Hochschild, 2016; Wuthnow, 2018).

At the same time, numerous policies have been passed in recent decades to equalize the playing field for marginalized populations (Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1998), leading to many social and economic advances for people of Color. Thus, there is an existential "threat" to the status quo from "others" due to perceptions of alienation due to liberal policies (Wimberly, 2020). Furthermore, Hochschild (2016), Wuthnow (2018), and others (e.g. Ferber, 1998; Isom Scott, 2018; Willer et al., 2016) find that rural White Americans more generally feel that their "dominant" status is being threatened, and thus fueling their support for Donald Trump (Sullivan, 2016). Research, however, also finds these sentiments manifest in highly gendered ways (e.g. Houts Picca and Feagin, 2007; Ferber, 1998; Frankenberg, 1993; Boehme and Isom Scott, 2020).

A Traditional Patriarchal Structure

As much as far-right movements are grounded in racial hierarchies, there is also a significant emphasis on patriarchal gender norms (Blee and Creasap, 2010; Ferber, 1998; Ferber and Kimmel, 2004; Frankenberg, 1993). As Ferber (1998) argues, white supremacy aims not only to protect the dominance of Whites over non-Whites, but White men over all others. Within this ideology, White men are the most disadvantaged social group, as even White women are perceived as receiving better treatment than themselves. Therefore, feminism stands alongside immigration, affirmative action, equal access to education and employment, and so forth, as a threat to the status quo of White men's continued dominance and social success.

Though the far-right is decidedly patriarchal, women play a large and active role (Blee, 1991; Kimmel, 2017), including significant representation in both membership and leadership (Kimmel, 2017; Montopoli, 2012). While White men may join such far-right groups when they feel that their dominant status is being threatened (by both people of Color and White women), explanations of women's involvement are often more complex and tend to involve two distinct arguments: (1) while recognizing their subordination to White men, White women perceive their dominant status over people of Color as threatened; or (2) rather than seeking power, women desire the traditional patriarchal lifestyle valued within far-right ideology.

Sociological perspectives suggest that status hierarchies, such as those based in race, ethnicity, gender, and class, work in tandem; that is—one's overall status in the social hierarchy is based on the combined status value of one's characteristics (e.g. Collins, 2019; Crenshaw, 1990; Isom Scott, 2020). For example, "a White woman knows that traditional society does not value her as much as a White man, but society does value her more than a Black woman" (Isom Scott, 2018: 135). Premised in Black feminist thought, some argue that White women do seek to maintain some semblance of power by asserting their status over men and women of Color (Collins, 2000). This is exemplified historically when examining White women's role in maintaining the system of slavery and asserting dominance over Black men and women—a role now believed to be far more prominent than previously suggested (e.g. Jones-Rogers, 2019)—as well as contemporarily when analyzing White women's attempts to control the Black population through calls to police (e.g. Amy Cooper [Bromwich, 2021]) or personal attacks, such as that on Emmet Till [Tyson, 2017]). In essence, while White women may accept their subordination to White men, they may seek a sense of authority, superiority, and power over Black men and women, a desire that aligns well with the ideology of the far-right.

An alternate explanation of White women's involvement in the far-right is based in their strong commitment to patriarchy and traditional gender roles. Those who support far-right movements tend to endorse patriarchal gender normative beliefs, namely protecting women's roles as caregivers and men's roles as patriarchs (Blee, 1991, 1996, 2002; Blee and Creasap, 2010; Houts Picca and Feagin, 2007). Women's affiliation with these movements, then, may be driven by beliefs in traditional family norms and motherhood ideologies (Dow, 2016) whereby women are viewed as non-political, mothers, wives, and nurturers (Lesselier, 2002). These women, who desire to live in a traditional, conservative household, may share in experiences of status threat and the sense of white victimhood because they want their men to be the traditional heads of household, the breadwinners, who support their families (Kimmel, 2017). In other words, while White women may not seek to establish or maintain power, they may join the far-right movements when they perceive that their traditional lifestyle is under siege in a culturally evolving society.

Applying an intersectional lens to this work may contextualize differences in the perspectives of White men and women. Specifically, understanding how statuses of race and gender are interrelated may shed light on women's alignment with far-right movements as well as explain

differences in perceptions of threat and the resultant "victim" ideology between men and women. This approach allows a better understanding of the complexity to the reasons for why White women may join far-right movements—not only because their traditional roles are threatened but because their dominant status over people of Color is threatened. While intersectional approaches were developed as a framework for studying the experiences of historically marginalized people (Collins, 2019; Crenshaw, 1990), theorists have expanded the application of intersectionality to include those with both privileged and oppressed identities (Frankenberg, 1993; Potter, 2015). This broadened application recognizes the multiplicity of identity and understands that social status is "simultaneously [influenced by] both oppression and privilege" (Burgess-Proctor, 2006: 36). Ultimately, White men and women likely experience status threat and "victim" ideology differently as a result of their gendered experiences and perceptions, even while sharing a strong racial identity.

The Era of Trump and Black Lives Matter

While Obama's presidency was touted as an indication of racial progress in the United States (Reny et al., 2019), Trump's presidential campaign reverted to a racist and misogynistic platform (Barkun, 2017; Crandall et al., 2018; Love, 2017). Trump's earliest campaign rallies targeted immigrants, namely Mexicans, whom Trump labeled as "criminal," "rapists," and "not [Mexico's] best" (Barnett, 2018). Trump's blatant disparagement of certain groups through anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-disability, and misogynistic rhetoric (Crandall et al., 2018) ultimately garnered support from white supremacist ideologies and groups (Barnett, 2018; Taylor, 2018). Smith and Hanley (2018) examined the American National Election Study from the 2016 election and found that Trump supporters voted for him largely due to his racist and misogynist beliefs. Overall, it was the appeal of an authoritarian, dominant, and intolerant leader that attracted many to vote for Donald Trump.

Given far-right groups' sense of victimhood and disdain for political correctness and social justice (Berbrier, 2000; Southern Poverty Law Center, nd), it is no wonder they quickly rallied around Trump's presidential campaign. Trump's campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again," quickly dubbed "Make America White Again" (Barnett, 2018), spoke to the nostalgia touted by the far-right, signaling his own belief that the country should be restored to its former white supremacist, patriarchal condition (Boehme and Isom Scott, 2020; Isom et al., 2021). Trump's overt racist remarks reinforced the far-right's own notions of white supremacy, and his willingness to reject the politically neutral approach that most politicians observe by emitting hate speech signaled his own opposition to "political correctness" (Barkun, 2017).

As Trump maintained a campaign centered on racism, some political scientists suggested that the 2016 presidential election was heavily influenced by measures of status threat (Mutz, 2018) and racial discrimination (Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019; Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018; Reny et al., 2019). Researchers identified racism as a primary motivating factor for Trump supporters (Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019; Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018), observing that anti-immigrant and racist ideology was successful in converting some traditionally independent and democratic voters to support Trump in 2016 (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018; Reny et al., 2019).

While Trump's election undoubtedly was a significant setback for racial equality in America, anti-racists activists have worked diligently to combat systemic racism in the United States. Following the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2013 and the death of Michael Brown, an unarmed Black man who was gunned down by police in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014 (Banks, 2018; Carney, 2016), the BLM movement has grown significantly to include over 30 chapters internationally (Clayton, 2018). BLM, started by three female anti-racist activists of Color, was developed as an inclusive movement against the police brutality faced by many Black Americans (Banks, 2018; Carney, 2016; Clayton, 2018). Since its inception, BLM has

expanded to combat a wide range of institutional racism and violence as well as individual-level prejudice experienced by communities and people of Color (Banks, 2018; Clayton, 2018). As the BLM movement continues to expand and draw fire from politicized media and conservative leaders (Banks, 2018; Taylor, 2018), racial tensions continue to rise. Estimations suggest that the BLM movement may be the "largest movement in US history" (Buchanan et al., 2020), with another recent upsurge in support following the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in 2020 (Ortiz, 2020). At the same time, survey data suggest that most Americans (71% of Black Americans and 56% of White Americans) share a negative view of race relations in the United States, with the majority feeling Trump's administration hindered racial progress (Horowitz et al., 2019). As these trends continue in the United States, understanding how white "victim" ideology, traditional patriarchal beliefs, support for Trump, and perceptions of social movements like BLM are interrelated is crucial for working to address racial tensions in America.

The Current Study

We employ a secondary analysis of a recent national survey (Forscher and Kteily, 2017) to investigate the associations between white "victim" ideology, support for Trump, patriarchal gender normative beliefs, and anti-BLM sentiments among White Americans. Our analysis is driven by six research questions:

1) Is a "victim" ideology associated with support for Trump among White Americans?
2) Is a "victim" ideology associated with anti-BLM sentiments among White Americans?
3) Does support for Trump condition the association between a "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments?
4) Does holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs condition the associations between a "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments?
5) Do patriarchal gender normative beliefs further condition the associations between support for Trump, "victim" ideology, and anti-BLM sentiments?
6) Do these conditional associations vary between White women and White men?

Addressing these questions will shed light on the factors influencing White Americans' perceptions of social and demographic shifts, such as the BLM movement, that they may perceive as signifying a threat to their position at the top of the status hierarchy. Furthermore, an investigation of the interplay between these factors will inform our understanding of the circumstances under which White Americans may (or may not) push back against such social movements or demographic changes. Unpacking these ideologies and beliefs is a needed step toward understanding the racial (and political) divide in America.

Method

Data

We utilize data collected in 2017 by Forscher and Kteily originally used to construct a psychological profile of Alt-Right members. Forscher and Kteily (2017) gathered the data from two convenience samples using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online platform that provides researchers (or "requesters") access to a pool of volunteer "workers" (i.e. registered survey respondents) from which to recruit study participants. Requesters may set any constraints or criteria for workers' eligibility to complete the "task" to better manage the resulting sample. Workers

are incentivized for their participation based on the standards established by the requesters (see https://www.mturk.com/product-details).

Although not a probability sample, online samples like those collected with MTurk have important benefits to research, particularly research involving public opinion. Because this study involves public attitudes on sensitive subject matters, it is important to minimize social desirability bias. Findings suggest that web-based surveys have less social desirability bias compared to surveys administered over the phone and in person (Baker et al., 2010; Chang and Krosnick, 2009). Moreover, nonprobability web-based surveys have a high degree of reliability (Buhrmester et al., 2011), and may yield better data quality than population-based web samples (Weinberg et al., 2014) and random digit dialing samples (Chang and Krosnick, 2009).

The first round of data collection purposefully sought a sample of Alt-Right members and paid respondents $3US for their participation. Inquiries, probes, and open-ended checks were placed throughout the survey to determine if participants were genuine members of the Alt-Right. Thus, despite findings that some MTurk respondents are dishonest to meet study qualifications (Chandler and Paolacci, 2017) and politically conservative individuals are often underrepresented on MTurk (Levay et al., 2016), the original investigators were diligent to ensure the validity of the sample. Data from a comparison sample of non-Alt-Right-affiliated individuals were collected 2 weeks later. No specific inclusion criteria were set for the comparison group, and probes were again included throughout the survey to ensure no one in the sample identified with the Alt-Right. Participants in this sample were paid US$2 for their participation. Forscher and Kteily (2017) deposited their data online (https://osf.io/xge8q/), making it accessible for use in the present study.[1]

For the present study, we merged the Alt-Right ($n = 978$) and comparison group ($n = 513$) samples creating a starting sample size of 1491. Given our focus on White Americans, all self-identified non-White respondents were removed from the initial dataset, cutting the sample size to 1058. The data were then further cut listwise for non-response following the demographic items (i.e. missing over 70% of responses) as well as for non-response on central variables of interest (e.g. "victim" ideology questions and anti-BLM questions) yielding a final sample of 755 White Americans (39.9% women). We analyzed the sample for systematic or randomly missing data patterns. While most items were missing less than 1%, missingness of the media items ranged from 0.3% to 33.4%. We employed multiple imputation to replace all missing values.[2]

Measures

Dependent Variable. Anti-BLM sentiment was measured by a factor[3] combining three items: "I support the BLM movement" (reverse coded from original); "I think that the BLM movement has been very harmful to our country"; and "I think that the BLM movement is racially divisive" (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) ($\alpha = .852$). Higher scores indicate greater *anti-BLM sentiment*.

Independent Variable. We constructed a factor combining nine items to capture Berbrier's (2000) white "victim" ideology: "(R)ate the extent to which you consider each one an issue in the United States: Discrimination against White people" (1 = not at all a problem to 7 = a big problem); "If Black Americans got to the top of the social hierarchy, they would want to keep a greater share of the power for their group at the expense of other groups"; "Black Americans are highly motivated to 'turn the tables' on the groups at the top of the social system and enjoy the advantages they've been enjoying"; "If Black Americans got to the top of the social hierarchy, they would want to stay on top and keep other groups down"; "Whites need to do more to remind the world about the challenges that White people face"; "Whites should lobby to repeal laws that give minorities an advantage on the basis of their race, at the expense of Whites"; "Our customs and national heritage are

the things that have made us great, and certain people should be made to show greater respect for them"; "More needs to be done so that people remember that 'White Lives' also matter"; "If Black Americans were on top, they would want the groups currently dominating to suffer"; "I think there are good reasons to have organizations that look out for the interests of Whites"; "Whites need to start looking out more for one another" (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree); "Assume that through collective struggle, Black Americans had attained equal social, economic, and political power as Whites. If Black Americans got to that point of exact equality, do you think that Black Americans as a group would be content with stopping right there, or do you think they would want to continue to push for more power?" (1 = stop right there to 7 = push for more power); (α = .951). Higher scores indicate greater *white "victim" ideology*.

Conditioning Variables. Support for Trump was measured by the question, "Which presidential candidate did you vote for in the 2016 election?" Responses were recoded to 1 = *Support for Trump* and 0 = voted for any other candidate/did not vote. *Patriarchal gender normative beliefs* were measured by the factor of two items: "Men and women each have different roles to play in society" (0 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree); and "A woman's place should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past" (1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree, reverse coded from original) (α = .650).

Control Variables. *Gender* is a dichotomous variable (1 = men). To measure *trust in conservative media*, respondents were presented the following prompt: "We'd like you to think about your perceptions of outlets for the news. You may view some outlets as trustworthy and some as not trustworthy, or even fake. Please rate the news outlets below as to how trustworthy or untrustworthy you perceive them to be" (0 = completely untrustworthy to 100 = completely trustworthy), and then provided a list of 22 news outlets including *CNN, ABC News*, and *The Huffington Post*. From the list, the mean of the seven most conservative outlets—*Fox News, Breitbart, The Rush Limbaugh Show, The Sean Hannity Show, The Glenn Beck Show, InfoWars*, and *The Daily Caller* (see Faris et al., 2017)—provided a control for trust in conservative media. Social dominance orientation is defined as one's degree of preference for inequality for perceived lower-status groups (Pratto et al., 1994), and is significantly associated with conservative political affiliation (Hiel and Mervielde, 2002) as well as association with extremist groups (Roccato and Ricolfi, 2005). *Social dominance orientation* was controlled for by a factor of six items taken from the SDO_7 scale (Ho et al., 2015)[4] (α = .923).

All participants were asked at the end of the survey, "Do you identify with the Alt-Right movement?" (1 = yes). The response served as an indicator of *Alt-Right affiliation* and a control for far-right ideology.[5] Given the intricate relationship between the BLM movement and police brutality (Chama, 2019; Ray et al., 2017), the following question was also controlled for: "I think that racism is deeply woven into law enforcement" (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree) and labeled *racism in law enforcement*. One's financial situation may affect their political and social views (Jost et al., 2009); thus, participant's *financial situation* was controlled for by the question, "How would you describe your own current economic situation—is it very bad, somewhat bad, somewhat good, or very good?" (1 = very bad to 4 = very good). And finally, given perceptions of status threat are often tied to feelings of social, political, and economic shifts in the country (Craig and Richeson, 2014; Mutz, 2018), participant's *satisfaction with the country* was controlled by the question, "Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States?" (1 = very dissatisfied to 7 = very satisfied). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for all variables of interest.

Analytical Strategy

The present analysis employed a series of binary logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Standardized coefficients are provided for ease of interpretation. For the logistic regressions, odds ratios (OR) above one signify greater odds of being a Trump supporter while results below one indicate lower odds. For the OLS regressions, the beta coefficient (β) provides the change in anti-BLM sentiment given a one standard deviation increase in the predictor variable with other factors held constant. To assess the conditioning effects, interaction terms were created using the product of white "victim" ideology and support for Trump as well as patriarchal gender normative belief independently as well as in conjunction. To apply a gendered lens and assess the distinctions between gender and patriarchal gender normative beliefs, each model was also assessed separately for women and men. Variance inflation factors suggest none of the present measures suffer from multicollinearity. Data were cleaned and analyzed in SPSS24.

Results

We generally hypothesize that Whites' perceptions of "victimhood" are associated with negative perceptions of the BLM movement as well as a greater likelihood of supporting Trump, particularly for White men. To assess these intricate associations, we proposed six research questions. We were first interested in the associations between white "victim" ideology and support for Trump. Table 2 Model 1 reveals "victim" ideology is significantly associated with Trump support, with odds of supporting Trump increasing by 68% for every one-unit increase in "victim" ideology holding other factors constant (OR = 1.68). While gender is not significant in Model 1, the female and male samples presented in Models 2 and 3 reveal these associations are gendered. Model 2 finds "victim" ideology is not associated with Trump support for White women, but Model 3 finds it is significantly associated with Trump support for White men, increasing their odds of Trump support by 104% (OR = 2.04). Furthermore, while trust in conservative media, satisfaction with the country, and Alt-Right affiliation significantly increase the odds of Trump support for both women and men, there are significant differences between women and men in regard to Alt-Right affiliation, with such having a greater influence for White women.[6] In addition, believing racism is embedded in law enforcement is also significantly associated with greater odds of Trump support for women, but is not significant for men. Thus, white "victim" ideology is a significant predictor of Trump support for White men, but not their female counterparts, and the overall odds of supporting Trump is driven by varied combinations of factors for White women and men.

We were next interested in the associations between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments controlling for Trump support and patriarchal gender normative beliefs. Table 3 presents the stepwise assessment of these associations as well as the full model split by gender. Of central note, the full sample models account for over 60% of the variance in anti-BLM sentiment among our sample of White Americans (73% among the female sample and 54% among the male sample) lending credence to the overall importance of the assessed factors. Model 1 reveals that white "victim" ideology is significantly associated with anti-BLM sentiment, accounting for a 46% increase in the likelihood of feeling negatively about the BLM movement for every one-unit increase in "victim" ideology holding other factors constant (β = .46). Model 2 reveals that supporting Trump accounts for a 9% increase (β = .09) when added to the model while other factors remain generally unchanged. Model 3 finds holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs is marginally associated with anti-BLM sentiment (β = .05, p = .09), again with other factors generally remaining unchanged. Thus, Models 1-3 suggest white "victim" ideology, Trump support, and patriarchal gender normative beliefs are independently, directly associated with anti-BLM

Table I. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
A Anti–Black Lives Matter Sentiment	1										
B White "Victim" Ideology	.726**	1									
C Trump Supporter	.508**	.512**	1								
D Patriarchal Gender Normative Beliefs	.494**	.570**	.415**	1							
E Gender (Men = 1)	.150**	.126**	.101**	.136**	1						
F Trust in Conservative Media	.408**	.480**	.491**	.408**	.080*	1					
G Social Dominance Orientation	.578**	.700**	.462**	.605**	.111**	.377**	1				
H Alt-Right Affiliation	.512**	.569**	.529**	.421**	.137**	.411**	.502**	1			
I Racism in Law Enforcement	.634**	.545**	.436**	.395**	.077*	.408**	.487**	.403**	1		
J Financial Situation	.146**	.146**	.233**	.078*	0.032	.215**	.177**	.186**	.136**	1	
K Satisfaction with the Country	.318**	.310**	.477**	.256**	0.065	.446**	.308**	.333**	.300**	.410**	1
Mean	0	0	.55	0	.60	35.2	0	.58	4.08	2.55	3.41
Standard Deviation	1	1	.50	1	.49	25.3	1	.49	2.02	.74	1.71
Minimum	−2.08	−2.06	0	−1.56	0	0	−1.33	0	1	1	1
Maximum	1.20	1.68	1	2.21	1	100	2.20	1	7	4	7

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 2. Logistic Regression of White "Victim" Ideology on Support for Trump.

			Women		Men	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	SE
White "Victim" Ideology[a]	1.68**	.16	1.19	.28	2.04**	.20
Controls						
Gender (Men = 1)	1.03	.21	—	—	—	—
Trust in Conservative Media	1.02**	.01	1.02**	.01	1.02**	.01
Social Dominance Orientation	1.29^	.14	1.33	.23	1.25	.18
Alt-Right Affiliation[a]	3.37**	.22	4.49**	.38	3.09**	.29
Racism in Law Enforcement[a]	1.21**	.06	1.41**	.11	1.12	.07
Financial Situation	1.06	.16	1.28	.25	.91	.20
Satisfaction with the Country	1.69**	.08	1.70**	.13	1.73**	.11
−2 Log Likelihood	607.64		217.95		382.63	
Cox & Snell R²	.434		.484		.398	

Note. ^*p* < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01.
[a]significant differences between women and men.

Table 3. OLS Regression of White "Victim" Ideology on Anti-Black Lives Matter Sentiment.

							Women		Men	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
White "Victim" Ideology	.46**	.04	.45**	.04	.44**	.04	.41**	.05	.46**	.05
Trump Supporter	—	—	.09**	.06	.09**	.06	.10*	.10	.08^	.08
Patriarchal Gender Normative Beliefs	—	—	—	—	.05^	.03	.04	.04	.07	.04
Controls										
Gender (Men = 1)	.05*	.05	.05*	.05	.05*	.05	—	—	—	—
Trust in Conservative Media[a]	−.02	>.00	−.03	>.00	−.04	>.00	−.02	>.00	−.06	>.00
Social Dominance Orientation	.05	.03	.04	.03	.02	.03	.01	.05	>.00*	.05
Alt-Right Affiliation	.09**	.06	.06*	.06	.06*	.06	.10*	.09	.04	.08
Racism in Law Enforcement	.32**	.01	.31**	.01	.31**	.01	.34**	.02	.29**	.02
Financial Situation	<.00	.03	−.01	.03	<.00	.03	.03	.05	−.02	.05
Satisfaction with the Country	.04	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.06	.03	−.01	.02
F	151.96**		137.66**		124.49**		85.80**		57.79**	
R²	.62		.62		.63		.73		.54	

Note. ^*p* < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01.
[a]significant differences between women and men.

Table 4. OLS Regression of White "Victim" Ideology on Anti-Black Lives Matter Sentiment with Conditioning Factors.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
White "Victim" Ideology	.56**	.05	.41**	.04	.50**	.05
Trump Supporter	.10**	.06	.09**	.06	.09**	.06
Patriarchal Gender Normative Beliefs	.05	.03	.08**	.03	−.03	.05
Trump Support X "Victim" Ideology	−.15**	.05	—	—	−.11**	.06
Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	−.12**	.02	−.14**	.04
Trump Support X Gender Norms	—	—	—	—	.12**	.07
Trump Support X Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	—	—	.02	.05
Controls						
Gender (Men = 1)	.04^	.05	.04^	.05	.04*	.05
Trust in Conservative Media	−.04	>.00	−.04	>.00	−.04	>.00
Social Dominance Orientation	.03	.03	.04	.03	.04	.03
Alt-Right Affiliation	.04	.06	.05^	.06	.05	.06
Racism in Law Enforcement	.29**	.01	.30**	.01	.30**	.01
Financial Situation	>.00	.03	<.00	.03	<.00	.03
Satisfaction with the Country	.01	.02	.01	.02	>.00	.02
F	117.63**		119.26**		95.94**	
R²	.64		.64		.65	

Note. ^$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

sentiment. When the sample is split by gender, we find "victim" ideology and Trump support, but not patriarchal gender normative beliefs, are the driving factors of anti-BLM sentiment for both women (Model 4: β = .41 and .10, respectively) and men (Model 5: β = .46 and .08 ($p = .06$), respectively). Furthermore, Alt-Right affiliation is significant for women (β = .10), but not men, whereas social dominance orientation is significant for men (β = .002), but not women. Thus again, while similar in many regards, the assessed factors operate in varied ways between White women and men.

We were finally interested in the conditioning effects of Trump support as well as patriarchal gender normative beliefs on the associations between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment. Table 4 shows the conditioning effects for the full sample. Model 1 reveals that supporting Trump does significantly condition the association between "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment (β = −.15). Model 2 further finds patriarchal gender normative beliefs also condition this association (β = −.12). Yet, Model 3 reveals that these factors do not work concurrently. The significant associations are graphed in Figure 1. Figure 1A shows while Trump supporters have a higher mean anti-BLM sentiment than non-Trump supporters, there are essentially no differences in negative sentiments between supporters and non-supporters among those with high white "victim" ideology. Thus, the association between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments are not strengthened further by Trump support, counter to what would be expected (Mutz, 2018). Figure 1B reveals a similar pattern for conditioning effects of patriarchal gender normative beliefs. While those with higher gender normative beliefs have a higher mean negative sentiment, believing

Figure 1. Significant Interactions for Full Sample.

Table 5. OLS Regression of White "Victim" Ideology on Anti-Black Lives Matter Sentiment with Conditioning Factors: Women Only.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
White "Victim" Ideology	.55**	.06	.35**	.05	.46**	.07
Trump Supporter	.11**	.09	.09*	.09	.10*	.09
Patriarchal Gender Normative Beliefs	.02	.04	.06	.04	<.00	.06
Trump Support X "Victim" Ideology	−.18**	.07	—	—	−.13**	.09
Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	−.15**	.03	−.11*	.05
Trump Support X Gender Norms	—	—	—	—	.07	.09
Trump Support X Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	—	—	−.02	.08
Controls						
Trust in Conservative Media[a]	−.03	>.00	−.03	>.00	−.04	>.00
Social Dominance Orientation	.04	.05	.03	.05	.03	.05
Alt-Right Affiliation	.08*	.09	.10*	.09	.09*	.09
Racism in Law Enforcement	.32*	.02	.33**	.02	.32**	.02
Financial Situation	.03	.05	.02	.05	.02	.05
Satisfaction with the Country[a]	.05	.02	.06	.02	.05	.02
F	83.46**		84.52**		66.52**	
R²	.74		.75		.75	

Note. ^$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.
[a]significant differences between women and men across all models.

in more traditional gender norms does not further bolster the associations between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments.

The above conditioning models were repeated for the female and male samples. Table 5 presents the results for White women. Model 1 reveals supporting Trump does significantly condition the association between "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment for women (β = −.18). Furthermore, Model 2 finds patriarchal gender normative beliefs also condition this association (β = −.15). Yet, as with the full sample, Model 3 reveals these factors do not work simultaneously for White women. Figure 2 presents the significant conditioning effects. Again, as well as with the full sample, Figure 2A reveals Trump support does not further bolster the associations between

Figure 2. Significant Interactions for Women.

Table 6. OLS Regression of White "Victim" Ideology on Anti-Black Lives Matter Sentiment with Conditioning Factors: Men Only.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
White "Victim" Ideology	.54**	.06	.44**	.05	.52**	.07
Trump Supporter	.09*	.08	.08^	.08	.07	.08
Patriarchal Gender Normative Beliefs	.07	.04	.10*	.04	−.05	.07
Trump Support X "Victim" Ideology	−.10*	.08	—	—	−.10^	.09
Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	−.09*	.03	−.15*	.06
Trump Support X Gender Norms	—	—	—	—	.18**	.09
Trump Support X Gender Norms X "Victim" Ideology	—	—	—	—	.03	.08
Controls						
Trust in Conservative Media[a]	−.06	>.00	−.05	>.00	−.05	>.00
Social Dominance Orientation	.01	.05	.01	.05	.02	.05
Alt-Right Affiliation	.02	.08	.04	.08	.03	.08
Racism in Law Enforcement	.28**	.02	.29**	.02	.30**	.02
Financial Situation	−.02	.05	−.02	.05	−.02	.05
Satisfaction with the Country[a]	−.02	.02	−.03	.02	−.03	.02
F	52.73**		53.29**		42.16**	
R²	.54		.55		.56	

Note. ^*p* < .10; **p* < .05; ***p* < .01.
[a]significant differences between women and men across all models.

white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment as does holding patriarchal gender normative beliefs (Figure 2B) among our White female sample.

Table 6 presents the conditioning effects of Trump support and patriarchal gender normative beliefs for White men. The same patterns emerged as in the female sample. Trump support (Model 1: β = −.10) and patriarchal gender normative beliefs (Model 2: β = −.09) each significantly condition the association between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment for our sample of White men independently, but do not significantly operate together (Model 3). Figure 3A and 3B reveal each conditioning factor weakens the association between "victim" ideology and negative

Figure 3. Significant Interactions for Men.

sentiments, though the overall anti-BLM sentiments were much higher for White men than their female counterparts.

Discussion

Using a status threat framework (e.g. Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Isom Scott, 2018; Kimmel, 2017; Olzak, 1992) and building on Berbrier's (2000) work on white "victim" ideology, we explored possible associations between white "victim" ideology, Trump support, patriarchal gender normative beliefs, and anti-BLM sentiments for White Americans. Additionally, we incorporated a gendered lens to better understand the unique ways in which these concepts interrelate for White men and women. First, our analysis suggests that white "victim" ideology is significantly associated with support for Trump. Notably, these associations differ for men and women, where "victim" ideology is significantly associated with support for Trump among men but not among women. Furthermore, we observe significant direct associations between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments, even while controlling for Trump support and patriarchal gender normative beliefs. Moreover, we find that both Trump support and patriarchal gender beliefs independently condition the associations between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiments. However, further analysis suggests that support for Trump and patriarchal gender norms do not work in tandem. Surprisingly, Trump support and patriarchal gender norms, independently, actually weaken the effects of white "victim" ideology on anti-BLM sentiment. Notably, these effects seem to be more significant for women than they are for men, suggesting that gender is a relevant factor when studying white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment.

Overall, our findings suggest that White people who report higher levels of white "victim" ideology tend to hold more negative perceptions of the BLM movement and are more supportive of the former president who promoted racist and misogynistic views. While we do not believe these finding suggest a causal "Trump effect," they do support the notion that supporting Trump was symptomatic of divisive ideologies strengthening in White America. Particularly, these outcomes contribute to the empirical literature supporting status threat and the adoption of a white "victim" ideology, wherein White people feel racially discriminated against or threatened by marginalized groups who they perceive to be gaining political and economic power at their own expense (Berbrier, 2000; Craig and Richeson, 2017; Kimmel, 2017; Major et al., 2018). As BLM has begun to expand and target both systemic violence and individual-level prejudice (Banks, 2018; Clayton, 2018), some White Americans may view the group as threatening the status quo and their racial dominance in America. Furthermore, our study lends evidence to the link between White Trump supporters and negative perceptions of the BLM movement, in line with extant research suggesting

that racial discrimination against marginalized groups (Abramowitz and McCoy, 2019; Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2018; Reny et al., 2019) and the fear of losing white power and privilege (Mutz, 2018) contributed to the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Trump's perpetual divisive rhetoric, including calls for physical violence against people of Color and immigrants (Barnett, 2018; Terkel, 2016), likely served as a battle cry for White "victims" who felt under siege by groups such as BLM and contributing to the fodder that fueled the Capitol riot. For instance, following Trump's election, hate crimes in the United States increased substantially (Crandall et al., 2018; Love, 2017), with the Southern Poverty Law Center (2016) reporting more than 400 hate crimes and incidents of harassment in the week following the election. Not surprisingly, the leading types of hate crimes included those that targeted immigrants and Black Americans (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016). This study sheds light on the beliefs, sentiments, and ideologies held by many White Americans which may inspire action, such as violence and hate crimes (e.g. Adamczyk et al., 2014; Isom Scott and Andersen, 2020). Relatedly, the recent surge in anti-Asian hate crimes has been attributed to Trump's rhetoric during the COVID-19 pandemic as well as his anti-Asian rhetoric throughout his presidency (Grover et al., 2020). Thus, while he did not cause racial and ethnic divisions in America, it is undeniable Trump added fuel to the fire and supporting him seemed to neutralize many people's civil restraints.

Our findings also support the significant and complex role of gender. White "victim" ideology was linked to Trump support among men but not women; yet support for Trump was more strongly tied to anti-BLM sentiment for women than for men. Notably, the independent effects of Trump support and patriarchal gender norms were more significant for women than men in conditioning the relationship between white "victim" ideology and anti-BLM sentiment. Furthermore, and perhaps of most import, are the negative conditioning effects we observed for Trump supporters and participants who held patriarchal gender normative beliefs. Although Trump supporters generally reported higher anti-BLM sentiments, white "victim" ideology had a greater impact on the anti-BLM sentiments of non-Trump supporters. In other words, participants who reported high levels of white "victim" ideology reported comparable anti-BLM sentiments, regardless of whether or not they were Trump supporters. These same trends held true for participants' patriarchal gender norms: high white "victim" ideology resulted in relatively equal anti-BLM sentiments for those with high and low patriarchal gender normative beliefs. Notably, these effects were more severe for women, where women who were non-Trump supporters and reported lower levels of patriarchal gender normative beliefs actually reported higher anti-BLM sentiments than female Trump supporters and those with higher patriarchal gender normative beliefs once white "victim" ideology was considered. These effects worked to equalize anti-BLM sentiment among men, regardless of their support for Trump or their beliefs in patriarchal gender norms.

The mitigating effects of Trump support and patriarchal gender normative beliefs suggest holding such sentiments likely normalizes perceived "victimhood" and anti-BLM sentiments. In other words, one's support for Trump and belief in patriarchy may actually reflect larger frustrations than just negativity toward racial progress and instead represent greater anti-establishment perspectives (e.g. anti-"normies" and QAnon believers; de Zeeuw et al., 2020; Nagle, 2017), which are also gendered (Bracewell, 2021; Fossett, 2021). Notably, our analyses suggest that these factors are complicated and intricately related, and gender, as well as holding patriarchal gender norms, may further contribute to the complexity of these relationships. Our results propose "victim" ideology, patriarchal gender normative beliefs, and supporting Trump operate distinctly, independently and in conjunction, between White men and women, suggesting threats to norms and perceived status vary in salience and significance within White America. Future intersectional research into these intricacies is warranted.

Additionally, the mitigating effects of Trump support and patriarchal gender normative beliefs may be explained if our outcome measure captured feelings of White pride rather than anti-Black sentiments (see Berbrier, 2000). While these feelings are not mutually exclusive, they are distinct beliefs, and it may be that Whites perceive supporting Trump and holding patriarchal gender beliefs as patriotic, and inherently pro-White, thus not so directly tied to anti-Black sentiments (see Kaufmann, 2019). However, Hughey (2012) found while white nationalists initially tout a pro-White platform during interviews, over time their rhetoric became anti-Black and racist. Indeed, it could be that pro-White and anti-Black rhetoric accomplish the same goal but are slightly different in how they manifest. Furthermore, Whites may rationalize their racism due to self-interests, whereby they feel that they are protecting their interests from those who are most threatening to them. For example, working-class Whites may be more threatened by Blacks than upper-class Whites, since working-class Whites are in the same "class" as Blacks. Thus, Blacks may be perceived to be the biggest threat to working-class Whites' livelihood (Wellman, 1993). This may also account for the positive association between perceptions of racism in law enforcement and anti-BLM sentiment, as well as the positive associations between satisfaction with the country and anti-BLM sentiment. It may be that respondents agree that racism exists within law enforcement but do not feel that the BLM movement is an appropriate response to such institutionalized inequality. Such public disapproval is not unique, as protest movements that challenge social norms have historically been met with widespread resistance (Banks, 2018; Clayton, 2018). These sentiments may be especially true for those who report higher levels of satisfaction with the status quo and subsequently disapprove of efforts to change the general order of things. Thus, our results may reflect a hesitancy to support protests or large-scale social changes among White Americans, but not necessarily racial discrimination or prejudice against Black people.

Furthermore, there is some debate in the literature if the threat felt in White America is rooted in power and status (e.g. Anderson, 2016; Kimmel, 2017) or identity (e.g. Jardina, 2019; Kaufmann, 2019). Our results lend credence to both arguments and the intricate relationships between them, particularly in how they manifest as felt "victimhood." While Kaufmann (2019) in particular outlines a general *whiteshift* across all of the Western world, the unique racialized history of America (Anderson, 2016; Bashi Treitler, 2013; Kendi, 2016; Wallis, 2016) must be central to understanding the distinct polarization in the United States. To be White in America means sitting atop the status hierarchy, holding the majority of positions of power, setting the rules for social structure, and sharing an identity founded on *not* being a person of Color (Anderson, 2016; Bashi Treitler, 2013; Rothstein, 2017; Wallis, 2016). Thus, despite the debate proposed above, in America, to be pro-White is inherently anti-Black, and that racialized hierarchy cannot be ignored. Thus, pro-whiteness and anti-Blackness are opposite sides of the same coin, and their intricacies are worthy of further research. For America to overcome our polarized divides, we must first reconcile our racial past, including confronting our white supremacist underpinnings. Work such as this provides some insight in how to begin to do just that.

Importantly, our analyses suggest intricate and powerful associations between these factors and gender. Our findings signify the need for additional research in this area, specifically through an intersectional lens. This study emphasizes the influence of race and gender on individual perspectives as we have identified several variations in the associations and interactions of variables based on gender. In accordance with an intersectional approach, future work should incorporate additional measures, such as sexual orientation and social class (Burgess-Proctor, 2006; Daly, 1993), to untangle the complex within-group differences for White Americans.

As with any research, our study has some limitations. Though the data contained well-constructed measures, some important demographic information was missing from the dataset. Specifically, little

or no information was gathered on age, class, geographic location, marital status, and religious beliefs—important sociodemographic variables that are often associated with cultural, social, and political ideology (Jost et al., 2009). Additionally, the survey data were collected through MTurk, which lends itself to some specific limitations. While MTurk has been widely supported and is becoming increasingly utilized for research purposes (e.g. Crandall et al., 2018; Landers and Behrend, 2015; Major et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2015), this platform suffers from some of the same limitations as other internet-based surveys, including concerns with survey takers' honesty, concerns regarding the representativeness of the sample, and accessibility issues associated with internet usage (Chandler and Paolacci, 2017; Riggle et al., 2005; Sharpe Wessling et al., 2017). Future research should incorporate different data sources to explore the consistency of our findings.

Additionally, this survey was conducted early in Trump's presidential term and there have been significant changes socially and politically since his inauguration. Current issues, including the COVID-19 pandemic, were increasingly polarized in the eve of the 2020 presidential election. Moreover, the BLM movement has become ever more prominent since the data were collected in response to several deaths of unarmed Black citizens during 2020 and culminating into daily protests across the country (Buchanan et al., 2020). Researchers should regularly collect this type of data in an effort to capture public sentiment alongside a rapidly evolving social and political culture.

Conclusion

Our country was founded on racial inequality, and white supremacy is firmly rooted in that history (Anderson, 2016). While political and racial tensions have ebbed and flowed over time, the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump set off a fire storm that continues to burn uncontrollably in the wake of numerous deaths at the hands of police, a presidential impeachment hearing, controversial Supreme Court Justices appointments, a global pandemic, and the insurrection of the Capitol on 6 January 2021. Donald Trump, known as the "Disruptor in Chief" (Wade, 2018), continued to live up to his name igniting fears and sparking responses on both sides of the political and racial divides until Joe Biden's inauguration on 20 January 2021. While beliefs in the status quo and racial hierarchies have always been tied to animosity toward social progress (e.g. Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Eitle et al., 2002; Giles and Hertz, 1994; Liska, 1992; Morrison et al., 2009; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), such sentiments have arguably never been as strong as the current moment. Despite Joe Biden winning the 2020 presidential election and Derek Chauvin being found guilty for the murder of George Floyd (Levenson and Cooper, 2021), America has not healed its racial divisions and social inequalities. We must understand the root causes and complexities that perpetuate such divisions to ever know how to remedy them. Our findings suggest white "victim" ideological sentiments are tied not only to resources and status, but identity, and these racialized sentiments are highly gendered. Furthermore, our findings highlight the convolutions between pro-White and anti-Black beliefs. Understanding the complexities and intricacies of these associations are vital to reveal legitimate ways to bridge social gaps. Work like this is the first step toward such empirical insights. Scholars such as W E B Du Bois (1920) have long called for the critical assessment of white supremacy and whiteness for over a century. While the sentiments around the racial hierarchy in America have shifted over time (Anderson, 2016; Kaufmann, 2019), our analysis shines a light on the current iteration of White Americans' sentiments. This is just one step toward answering the call of Du Bois and other progressive scholars (e.g. Bell, 1995; Collins, 2019; Delgado and Stefancic, 2013). We hope this will serve as a catalyst for the pursuit of knowledge that can inform socially just change to heal our divided America.

ORCID iD

Deena A Isom [iD] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9289-0033

Notes

1. The original principal investigators employed several strategies to ensure those in the Alt-Right sample genuinely identified as such as well as were human respondents and not "bots." First, they included probes at the beginning and end of the survey, with the last question urging honesty and ensuring compensation was not response dependent. Additionally, if a respondent answered they did not truly identify with the Alt-Right, they were blocked from participating in either survey for the study. Furthermore, open-ended questions were mined for indicators of participants not genuinely being a part of the Alt-Right (i.e. respondents copying the description of the Alt-Right from Wikipedia or the Southern Poverty Law Center when asked to describe the movement), and thus were flagged for exclusion from the analysis. See Forscher and Kteily (2017) for a detailed discussion.
2. SPSS employs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques for multiple imputation, which simulates random draws from nonstandard distributions using Markov chains (see Gilks et al., 1996; van Buuren, 2012). The present analyses utilized five imputed datasets, the default in SPSS.
3. We utilized principal components factor analysis (Bryant and Yarnold, 1995); individual item loadings for all factor scores available upon request.
4. Specific items are: An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom; Some groups of people are simply inferior to others; Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top (reverse coded); No one group should dominate society (reverse coded); We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed (reverse coded); We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups (reverse coded) (1 = strong disagree to 7 = strongly agree).
5. This question appeared at the end of the surveys, which began with a description of the aims of the study (i.e. for the Alt-Right subsample: "We're interested in learning more about people who choose to identify with the alt-right movement. We feel that there are a lot of misunderstandings about the alt-right, and that the views of people who identify with the alt-right are not well-represented. We want to address this issue. This is a chance to ensure that your views are represented accurately in the mainstream media or other outlets" [Forscher and Kteily, 2017]). And, the "Alt-Right" is referred to repeatedly throughout the surveys, including open-ended questions where the participants could describe what they believe the Alt-Right movement is. Thus, while only a single-item indicator, the participants were probed throughout the surveys to understand what was meant by "Alt-Right."
6. Following Paternoster et al. (1998), z scores were calculated between women and men for each factor in each model. Significant differences are flagged and noted in Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6.

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